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ABSTRACT 
AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING INFORMATION SHARING 
AMONG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
By Scott Driskill Bransford 
 
May 2012 
 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate using survey data to 
find factors or barriers which contributed to local law enforcement participation 
and support of intelligence information sharing. Following the September 11, 
2001, attacks in New York City and Arlington, Virginia, new homeland security 
initiatives and directives were created from the legislative and executive 
branches of the federal government. Several new initiatives and directives 
provided new communication opportunities for partnerships between all levels of 
law enforcement to combat the future threat of domestic terrorism. 
The evaluation literature indicated that a majority of post-9/11, initiatives, 
including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, were strategically 
implemented using a top-down, reactive approach to terrorism-related 
intelligence gathering. Technological, organizational, or cultural breakdowns 
between the federated jurisdictions of law enforcement contributed to the 
vulnerability of United States defense capabilities. Disparate pieces of 
intelligence information were available to several federal, state, and local terror 
investigation agencies, but the agencies were not able to piece together the 
information in a timely manner.  
 iii 
The study examined implementation issues from a bottom-up perspective 
with participant local law enforcement departments in four separate states, 
across four geographic areas of the country. In order to examine these issues, 
responses of participants in the study were analyzed through the administration 
of a survey instrument. Participants also were provided an optional opportunity to 
provide qualitative data on the last page of the survey instrument. One of the 
goals of the study was to identify barriers so a more proactive approach with 
more partnerships can be implemented through the development of a seamless 
communicative network where terror information can be shared interoperable 
across all levels of law enforcement. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Study 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the term homeland security became a 
common reference for American citizens with regard to efforts to combat 
terrorism (Lansford, Pauley, & Covarrubias, 2006). After 9/11, agents from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (IANS), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked in 
conjunction with local municipalities to track potential suspects. Federal, state, 
and local agencies quickly gathered information regarding the localities and 
activities of the alleged 9/11 terrorists, but failed to fully and completely 
discriminate critical intelligence information contained within each agency 
(Sullivan, 2005). 
Following 9/11, the Bush Administration undertook an extensive 
reorganization of governmental organizational structures. On October 8, 2001, 
President George W. Bush established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) 
within the Executive Office of the President as well as a Homeland Security 
Council (HCS). Both the OHS and HCS were established to coordinate efforts 
relating to all aspects of terrorism. With the creation of the OHS and HCS, 
information sharing efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies have become a possibility (Relyea, 2004). 
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On November 19, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (Office of Homeland Security, 2002) for the purpose of creating the 
Department of Homeland Security. The overall mission of the Department of 
Homeland Security was to successfully merge 22 separate agencies with 
separate missions into one agency that incorporates all aspects of 
counterterrorism. The Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (HSIA, 2002) 
represented a more detailed strategic plan in an effort to clearly define the roles 
and responsibilities of each government agency. The primary goal was to expand 
the sharing of homeland security information among federal intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies with state and local law enforcement agencies. Provisions 
contained within the HSIA state the following:  
 The federal government is mandated by the United States Constitution 
to protect every state from invasion, which includes terrorist attacks.  
 State and local law enforcement personnel should have access to 
homeland security information. The information shared should be 
balanced with the need to preserve the classified status of each 
document, as well as to protect the sources and methods used to 
acquire the information. 
 Security clearances should be granted to certain state and local 
personnel in order to facilitate the sharing of information regarding 
specific terrorist threats among federal, state, and local levels of 
government. 
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 State and local law enforcement personnel should possess the 
capability to gather information on suspicious activities and terrorist 
threats not possessed by federal intelligence agencies. 
 Information systems, including the National Law Enforcement 
Telecommunications System and the Terrorist Threat Warning System, 
should continue to be developed in order to achieve rapid sharing of 
sensitive and unclassified information among federal, state, and local 
entities. 
 A singular, national terrorism database between federal, state, and 
local law enforcement should be established to avoid duplication of 
existing information systems (HSIA, 2002). 
The HSIA (2002) overwhelmingly passed in the House of Representatives 
by a vote of 422 to 2. Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA), who coauthored 
the bill with Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), believed the bill almost unanimously 
passed because it offered a systematic approach to information sharing, which, if 
implemented before 9/11, may have prevented the attacks. Harman states,  
It is my sincere belief that proper information sharing might have 
prevented 9/11. Without such systems, dots that could be connected to 
save American lives are left scattered across various intelligence 
agencies. This bill helps solve two critical problems: information sharing 
between the FBI and CIA, and sharing between the federal government 
and local first responders like mayors, police and firefighters. (The Virtual 
Office of Congresswoman Jane Harman, 2002, para. 3) 
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Although most intelligence concerning suspected terrorists is accumulated 
at the federal level, state and local law enforcement are the agencies most likely 
to encounter domestic terrorists. During a congressional hearing that preceded 
the creation of the HSIA (2002), Congresswoman Harman (The Virtual Office of 
Congresswoman Jane Harman, 2002) noted one example of a missed 
opportunity. Two days prior to the 9/11 attacks, one of the hijackers was stopped 
for speeding by a Maryland State Trooper. The officer did not detain the suspect 
because he was not aware the individual was listed on the CIA watch list of 
suspected terrorists (The Virtual Office of Congresswoman Jane Harman, 2002). 
The inquiry conducted by the 9/11 commission raised new issues 
involving the lack of cooperation and information sharing on all levels of law 
enforcement. Specifically in question was the investigation strategy concerning 
the activities of two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi. Both 
suspects lived in San Diego, California, and rented a room from a man who was 
reportedly an undercover FBI informant. The National Security Agency (NSA) 
first learned the identities of the two terrorist suspects and their connections to 
Al-Qaeda in 1999 through intercepted communications in the Middle East. The 
CIA detained the men in 2000, after both suspects attended a meeting of Al-
Qaeda operatives in Malaysia, and learned of Alhazmi traveling to Los Angeles, 
California in March 2000. However, intelligence information involving the case 
was scattered among several different government agencies, and was not linked 
until after the 9/11 attack. In August 2001, both suspects were added to a watch  
 
5 
 
list in order to prevent entry into the United States. However, by this date both 
were residing in the United States in preparation for the 9/11 attacks (Emerson, 
2002). 
On December 16, 2006, the Executive Office of the President released 
Guideline 2, a Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
for the purpose of the prevention of domestic terrorism. The directive initiated a 
common strategic framework which assigned roles and communication 
responsibilities to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The 
memorandum called for interoperable sharing of terrorism information, homeland 
security information, and law enforcement information between and among 
federal, state, and local law enforcement, with the addition of participating 
community entities (Office of Homeland Security, 2007). 
The President’s memorandum recognized the importance of state and 
local law enforcement as crucial to United States counterterrorism efforts, as 
local law enforcement comprises many of the first responders to a domestic 
attack. The 9/11 attack demonstrated the possibility that foreign terrorists already 
could reside in local communities as future domestic targets are identified. The 
federal government expressed concern regarding the rising threat posed by 
individual homegrown terrorists drawing inspiration from established global 
terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaida. Whether a plan for a terrorist attack 
originates in the United States or overseas, critical intelligence information is 
obtained by local police officers during the course of routine law enforcement 
activities (Office of Homeland Security, 2007). 
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The memorandum further directed state and local police departments to 
deliver counterterrorism responsibilities in addition to core missions, including the 
protection of public health and safety, as well as to provide emergency and non-
emergency services. While state and local law enforcement work to prevent 
future terrorist attacks, the performance of routine duties must continue, including 
response to service calls and confronting all types of public health and safety 
issues. Counterterrorism success is dependent upon the development of strong 
partnerships with the public. This relationship needs to be constructed based 
upon a fundamental level of communication and trust between local police and 
members of the community (Adams, Rohe, & Accury, 2002; Chappell, 2009). 
New partnerships could be created and utilized in conjunction with ongoing 
policing activities in order to protect communities with the additional involvement 
of key community representatives (Office of Homeland Security, 2007). 
The memorandum acknowledged the needs of state and local agencies in 
an attempt to comprehensively incorporate counterterrorism and homeland 
security activities with federal law enforcement agencies. Specifically, it required 
local law enforcement access to timely, credible, and actionable intelligence 
disseminated among all levels of law enforcement. The memorandum 
recommended an organizational culture change in law enforcement which 
recognized the importance of fusing information regarding all crimes with national 
security implications. The organizational change included the development of 
training, task forces, and law enforcement strategy designed to address terrorist 
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strategies and capabilities through improvement of improved information sharing 
processes (Office of Homeland Security, 2007). 
One of the findings of the 9/11 Commission was the recommendation of a 
federally mandated approach to information sharing originating from the federal 
to the local level. Guideline 2 disagreed with the 9/11 Commission’s findings, and 
instead recognized the criticality of local law enforcement support and 
participation in any proposed counterterrorism strategy. Guideline 2 recognized 
the prevention of attack strategies similar to 9/11 would have to be initiated from 
the local level to the federal level, using a bottom-to-top approach when 
necessary. The participation of law enforcement agencies on all levels is 
essential to the development of an interoperable network which would allow for 
seamless communication. The strategic development of an interoperable 
communication system would be mandatory, and local law enforcement’s 
participation would need to be compulsory for the development of such a system 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Office of Homeland Security, 
2007). 
Statement of the Problem 
There are several problems that are barriers to intelligence information 
sharing among the federal, state, and local levels of law enforcement. First, the 
organizational structure of local law enforcement must be overhauled from 
traditional, militaristic policing agencies, which have historically operated as a 
closed organization, to a more open organization capable of operating in a 
problem-solving capacity (Goldstein, 1979). Doherty (2006) stated local law 
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enforcement must integrate homeland security initiatives into a proactive, 
community-style approach. Counterterrorism initiatives need to be seamlessly 
integrated into everyday policing activities, while simultaneously changing the 
traditional organizational police structure for the purpose of better communication 
protocol. The outdated militaristic style of policing must be replaced by 
community-oriented policing initiatives, implemented with the strategic goal of 
better communication strategies among all levels of law enforcement. Chappell 
(2009) referred to the implementation of new proactive policing initiatives as 
uneven, at best, specifically during the initial and implementation stages of the 
process. 
Second, from a federal perspective, the United States employs a 
federated governmental structure which organizes law enforcement agencies 
and departments into separate layers (federal, state, and local) according to 
invisible jurisdictional boundaries (Relyea, 2004). The federated structure 
contains bureaucratic fiefdoms and secrecy that promote politics over substance. 
Prior to 9/11, each layer of law enforcement operated in relative isolation 
(Lansford et al., 2006). The majority of intelligence investigations are conducted 
with minimal communication and assistance from other agencies (Riley & 
Hoffman, 1995). 
The concept of change requires a new set of directives for every police 
officer in the agency, as well as an overall organizational transformation of police 
culture. A shift from traditional to a community policing paradigm within police 
organizations may affect the morale and productivity of individual officers. New 
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training programs must be developed to guide local line officers through the 
process of sharing intelligence information with state and federal law 
enforcement agencies, and to become proficient at new responsibilities. Line 
officers must be prepared to handle the investigative, technical, and analytical 
aspects of information sharing. The future of law enforcement and, specifically, 
the rapid advancement of technology demands line officers possess the 
analytical skills necessary to successfully conduct domestic terrorism 
investigations.  
Roberts (2006) stated technological change must accompany 
organizational change if comprehensive intelligence information sharing is to 
occur. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006) stated prior to 
the 9/11 attacks, a standardized communication system was not operational, 
which resulted in an inferior and disjointed information sharing process. 
Traditionally, public safety agencies developed and acquired communication 
systems solely for individual agency usage, with no strategic planning for wider 
compatibility. Communication failures, resulting in non-existent situational 
awareness among first responders, increased the magnitude of the disaster of 
9/11 and greatly restricted relief efforts. Rapid, effectual response to a 
catastrophic event is predicated on a reliable communication system capable of 
maintaining situational awareness and command-and-control functions between 
responding agencies. Currently, such a technological system that can seamlessly 
connect all levels of law enforcement does not exist (GAO, 2006). Modern 
investigative tools such as cellular phones, e-mails, the Internet, and other 
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wireless devices all are critical components of a successful interoperable 
information sharing system that must be incorporated into a single network.  
The 9/11 Commission stated a single database needs to be implemented 
including a vertical, bottom-up approach that encompasses all levels of law 
enforcement. Information sharing initiatives cannot be successful without the full 
support of rank and file police officers, officers on daily patrol who work with the 
community to obtain the most accurate assessment of criminal enterprises. 
Goldstein (1990) stated rank and file police officers are an invaluable resource in 
helping to solve community problems as well as large social problems. Goldstein 
(1990) believed solicitation of rank and file police officers is an excellent way to 
begin to solve any policing or societal problem. Rank and file officers offer 
opinions based on their experience of hundreds to thousands of individual cases, 
and offer a mix of hard facts, rich insights, and strong opinions. Goldstein (1990) 
believed that as scholars, there exists an ethical obligation to assess all police 
opinions through careful examination, and to never underestimate the enormity of 
their contributions. 
As in the case of 9/11, even though the Constitution states the federal 
government is responsible for the protection of the United States, police officers 
at the local levels are most likely to confront a domestic terrorist. The reality of 
police work is even the most ambitious and well planned initiatives cannot be 
achieved if police officers entrusted with the delivery of new initiatives believe 
their time could be better utilized in other areas of enforcement. Therefore, local  
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police officers provide the most critical link to an information system capable of 
vertical and horizontal communication between agencies. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to examine through survey data the 
organizational, political, and technical barriers that contribute to local law 
enforcement sharing relevant terrorist information with other law enforcement 
agencies. Following 9/11, new homeland security initiatives were created by the 
executive and legislative branches of the United States government. These 
initiatives provided new communication opportunities for partnerships between 
local and federal law enforcement, with the explicit purpose of the protection of 
the United States homeland.  
The results of this study provide further insight for police chiefs and 
personnel of local agencies regarding the perceptions of both law enforcement 
officers and technology personnel as to whether information sharing initiatives 
are viewed as a priority. If the level of interest is high, the probability of the future 
achievement of a comprehensive information sharing network becomes a serious 
possibility.  
In addition, this study focused on the level of interest among rank and file 
law enforcement officers that are entrusted with performing the majority of work 
in the field. The reality of police work is even the most ambitious and well-
planned initiatives will not be achieved if the officers entrusted with delivery of 
police services believe their time could be better utilized in other areas of 
enforcement. This study identified potential barriers as well as determined 
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indicators for successful information sharing. If significant barriers to information 
can be overcome with the input and support of workers critical to the 
achievement of these goals, it follows that participation and growth of future 
intelligence information sharing programs will be advanced by this study, as well 
as future studies. 
Justification of the Study 
The reality of early 21st century terrorism has propelled the future of 
American policing into a new era, characterized by an emphasis on homeland 
security (Oliver, 2007). International terrorists thousands of miles from American 
soil have proven with the attack of 9/11 that the most pervasive and evil acts are 
now possible with the utilization of modern technology. Paradoxically, the attacks 
of 9/11 have accelerated the technological advancement possibilities concerning 
the mobilization of American police forces. The future of policing in the United 
States demands the proactivity, not reactivity, of all levels of law enforcement 
working together within the framework of an interoperable communication 
system. This study is justified by its emphasis on the future course of modern 
American policing, specifically the identification of barriers that prohibit the free 
flow of intelligence information across all levels of United States law 
enforcement. This study advocates and encourages the discussion critical to the 
implementation of proactive, futuristic police techniques, such as information 
sharing, crime analysis, and community problem-solving, all critical policing tools 
for the prevention of future domestic terrorist attacks.  
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Limitations of the Study 
There were several limitations to this study. First, the study was completed 
with the utilization of a convenience sample as opposed to a random sample. 
Piquero and Hickman (1999) stated the use of convenience samples in 
criminological studies has been the subject of debate among practitioners 
(Hagan & McCarthy, 1997; Jenson, Erikson, & Gibbs, 1978). The primary issue 
to samples of convenience has been the issue of representativeness. Piquero 
and Hickman stated a limited sample assessment should be eligible for 
utilization, provided the sample directly relates to police officers speaking to the 
policing profession. According to Piquero and Hickman, police officers can be 
easily conceptualized in a convenience sample because this study was directly 
related to police officers and attitudes and perceptions of their own work. Piquero 
and Hickman state as long as the data is collected with questions geared toward 
such as sample, the resulting information gleaned from the study should be able 
to meet at least a minimum threshold resulting in preliminary scientific evidence 
regarding local law enforcement officers and their perceived support of 
information sharing initiatives. 
Piquero and Hickman (1999) added the most vital need in any evaluation 
of a new area of study is the systematic collection of data. The use of a 
convenience sample in an experimental study presents a unique opportunity for 
subsequent researchers to build on the results of this study with future research, 
which may affirmatively influence the direction of research in subsequent years. 
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Issues Concerning Internal Validity 
With regard to internal and external validity, Campbell and Stanley (1966) 
published the first scientific explanation of internal validity in modern research. 
Internal validity is critical to the integrity of this study because low internal validity 
represents plausible alternative explanations for the real factors underlying 
support of intelligence information sharing initiatives. Campbell’s and Stanley’s 
original research involved the educational field and specifically addressed the 
issue of how new educational programs could be infused into school 
environments. They stated the tenants of interval validity, and provided 
recommendations for solving internal validity problems with the aid of appropriate 
research techniques. Campbell and Stanley also categorized internal validity into 
categories of threats, which they identified as time related threats, selection 
threats, and threats of subject reactivity. 
Campbell’s and Stanley’s (1966) concept of history is applicable to the 
possible threats to internal validity in this study. History refers to events which 
occur outside the control of the research setting, which may affect participants’ 
responses in regard to their support of information sharing. Law enforcement’s 
opinion of intelligence information sharing is shaped, in part, by the catastrophic 
events of 9/11 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The 9/11 attack 
is widely recognized as the largest assault to the homeland in the history of the 
United States. If another major attack were to occur during the formulation of this 
study, this would represent a serious threat to internal validity of the proposed 
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study. According to Campbell and Stanley, there is no available research 
technique that could be employed to overcome this situation. 
Another time threat to internal validity is what Cook and Campbell (1979) 
refer to as the concept of maturation. Maturation refers to natural changes that 
occur in the participants of studies over a period of time. As time passes from the 
tragic events of 9/11, law enforcements’ support of intelligence information 
sharing could decrease based on the fact a major attack has not taken place in 
the United States since 2001. This researcher acknowledges there is a possibility 
that law enforcement personnel could believe other programs are more important 
to their communities based on the rationalization that no major terror attack has 
occurred domestically in over a decade.  
Cook and Campbell (1979) additionally warned selection bias could occur 
when participants are not randomly selected, and instead are allowed to 
volunteer. These procedures can result in threats to internal validity because 
there may be substantial differences between those participants who decide to 
complete the survey and those who do not. Subjects who volunteer also can 
differ concerning a number of personal characteristics from those subjects who 
did not volunteer. For example, a study conducted by Rosenthal and Rosnow 
(1991) revealed subjects who tend to volunteer for studies (among other 
attributes) tend to be better educated, possess a higher I.Q., be more self-
disclosing, and be more sociable. 
Another threat to internal validity is found in the concept of reactivity. 
Whitley (1996) stated reactivity is a danger to internal validity because subjects 
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may change their behavior and react to the social situation surrounding the study 
rather than to the study itself. Subjects may adopt and change responses to the 
survey based on what they believe the researcher wants to report. In this study, 
the potential for reactivity was addressed by giving subjects a paper-pencil test, 
thus removing participants from an artificial, laboratory setting. In addition, 
subjects were given adequate time to respond to the survey questions. Finally, 
no face-to-face contact occurred between the subject and this researcher, thus 
minimizing the opportunity for reactivity. 
Threats to External Validity 
Cook and Campbell (1979) state that the concept of external validity can 
be expressed by answering the question of how broadly the findings in a study 
apply, while being simultaneously conducted under a wide-ranging set of 
conditions. Cook and Campbell refer to this term as simply the “generalizability of 
findings” (p. 42). Vidmar (1979) was more specific with the definition of external 
validity, dividing the concept into three distinct subgroups he called structural, 
functional, and conceptual components. 
Vidmar (1979) described the structural component of external validity as 
the component which focuses on the methodology of a study. In this study, an 
effort was made to expand the generalizability of the study by increasing the 
number of police departments in the study to four, and also by increasing the 
scope of the study to include police departments in four distinct areas of the 
country. Regional police departments around the United States have different 
standard operating procedures and cultural norms that potentially may influence 
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whether the results of this study are relevant in the presence of these individual 
departmental differences.  
Whitley (1996) stated external validity can be strengthened by increasing 
the overall generalizability, meaning the results can be compared from one 
department to another. It is an advantage of this study to be able to collect and 
analyze data from both across and between sites. By collecting data across sites, 
this researcher collected and analyzed the data as one set, across all four sites. 
By also collecting the data between the respective law enforcement departments, 
this researcher collected and analyzed the research individually for each 
department, and then the individual departments allowed for comparisons to be 
drawn from one department to another. By taking this approach, threats to 
external validity were minimized but not entirely eliminated. However, even after 
increasing the number and scope of the study, this researcher acknowledges 
generalizability issues remain, which never can be completely controlled. There 
may be differences within the departments, even with a significant increase in the 
number of departments participating in the survey. 
The functional element of external validity refers to the degree to which 
the psychological processes that operate in a study are similar to the 
psychological processes at work in a particular natural setting. Because this 
study occurred in a non-laboratory field setting, the threat to external validity was 
minimized in relation to the functional aspect. However, this researcher 
acknowledges a survey contains its own set of limitations as a research 
technique. It is possible that subjects failed to respond honestly when completing 
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pen-paper tests. Law enforcement personnel may have injected their own beliefs 
as to the manner of which they are expected to think and behave in an artificially 
constructed research setting. This researcher attempted to minimize this type of 
behavior by ensuring confidentiality for all participants who volunteered to 
participate in the survey. By ensuring confidentiality, participants felt more 
comfortable to report truthfully. 
An example of this type of threat to external validity is commonly referred 
to as the Hawthorne Effect. Adair (1984) defined the Hawthorne Effect as a 
problem in research experiments where human subjects’ behavior is modified 
because the subjects in the study possess the knowledge that they are in 
experiment. Gottfredson (1996) theorized that criminal justice studies are more 
vulnerable to the Hawthorne Effect because law enforcement personnel 
generally seek to improve performance and solicit supervisory feedback if it will 
advance their careers. Also, Gottfredson stated law enforcement tends to offer 
promotion reviews for organizational personnel at a much slower pace than other 
professions. Gottfredson believed frequent reviews and job feedback are crucial 
to controlling for the Hawthorne Effect in all types of action research. The 
rationale is if law enforcement personnel are satisfied with their supervision, they 
are significantly less likely to alter their behavior in a research setting. 
Whitley (1996) described the conceptual component of external validity as 
the degree to which the problem statement corresponds to problems considered 
important in a natural setting. Threats to external validity are minimized 
conceptually, in part, because the research presented in this study is of practical 
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relevance to law enforcement and the tasks police officers perform. The focus of 
this study on intelligence information sharing is directly related to the law 
enforcement profession and is a crucial component to the additional 
responsibility required of law enforcement in the 21st century. The results of this 
study are of direct benefit to law enforcement in the future delivery of their job 
duties. 
Assumptions of the Study 
The process of conducting social research required this researcher to 
make basic assumptions. It is important that this researcher recognize the 
assumptions made, which may or may not mitigate the research findings. In 
developing the conceptual and methodological framework for this study, the 
following assumptions were made: 
 The participants in the study answered the survey questions as 
honesty as possible.  
 The individual, organizational, and technological barriers identified in 
the study can be inferred to represent other settings and or other forms 
of organizational change. 
 This researcher, through the implementation of the applied research 
methodology, was able to accurately identify the most important issues 
to local line law enforcement officers as it relates to sharing intelligence 
information.  
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 The survey instrument utilized in the study represented an accurate 
and reliable means to access local law enforcement attitudes, 
opinions, and experiences.  
 The data collection procedures outlined in the Methods section of this 
study were able to be carried out as planned. 
Summary 
Chapter I introduced the importance of the study. The background, 
purpose statement, and significance of the problem created a roadmap for the 
study. The research questions and hypotheses provide grounding for the 
direction of the study. Finally, issues concerning internal and external validity, as 
well as assumptions and limitations of the study provide an additional foundation 
for comprehending the research.  
The problem presented in this study is the identification of organizational, 
environmental, and technical barriers to the implementation of intelligence 
information sharing initiatives. Specifically, this study examined the effect these 
barriers have on local police officers as a determination is made to support 
proactive techniques needed to join federal, state, and local law enforcement 
together for the purpose of domestic terrorism prevention. The quantitative study 
examined the relationship between barriers to information sharing (Akbulut, 
2003) and local police support of intelligence information sharing initiatives 
(Lyons, 2002). 
Chapter I contained an introduction of the basic concepts of this study. 
Chapter II presents a review of literature related to the research questions and 
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hypotheses of this study. The literature review included an examination of the 
background surrounding the transformation from reactive to proactive policing 
strategy needed to prevent future terrorist attacks. In addition, police subculture 
is discussed to determine why the sharing of information both between and 
among agencies has been historically limited. Finally, technical barriers are 
examined to explain the difficulty in the establishment of an interoperable 
network, which would connect all levels of law enforcement together to aid in 
both investigative and emergency first responder situations.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Chapter I presented an overview of the problem: the barriers to the 
development of a comprehensive intelligence information sharing initiative across 
all levels of law enforcement. The purpose of this experimental study was to 
understand the lived experiences of local law enforcement officers as it relates to 
skills and strategies needed to implement information sharing initiatives. The 
conclusions derived from the current research study provide law enforcement 
leaders on all levels of government an understanding of the motivating factors of 
line officers in performance of their daily job assignments. Specifically, this study 
examined the local law enforcement officers’ willingness to share investigative 
information with other law enforcement agencies.  
The literature review presented in Chapter II summarizes theoretical and 
empirical studies that provide the background necessary for understanding 
important aspects of information sharing. A clearer understanding of the barriers 
law enforcement agencies confront in the establishment of improved 
communication is necessary to develop comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy. These barriers need to be overcome to advance the efficient and 
accurate facilitation of intelligence information across all levels of law 
enforcement.  
Classical organizational theory and modern structural organization theory 
are discussed with the goal of demonstrating how the application of the tenants 
of these theories can help overcome information sharing barriers. The 
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organizational section articulates how government bureaucracies were created 
and, specifically, how operational strategies evolved as a barrier to information 
sharing. Goldstein (1990) stated that enforcement agencies need to reevaluate 
organizational structure and engage in proactive policing styles, which would 
encourage communication and contribute to the solution of serious societal 
problems. Lansford et al. (2006) stated to date there is not a comprehensive, 
proactive information sharing strategy for the development of accurate and 
efficient sharing of information across all levels of law enforcement. 
Documentation 
The following literature represents extensive research of peer-reviewed 
journals, books, and dissertations authored by scholars in the fields of criminal 
justice, sociology, and public administration. Electronic database search engines 
were utilized to identify studies that increased awareness of the barriers involved 
in the implementation of information sharing initiatives. Electronic database 
search topics include the key words police, terrorism, homeland security, 
administrative theory, organization structure, and barriers to organizational 
communication. Research studies included sources determined by the author to 
be most applicable to increasing the knowledge of intelligence information 
sharing. 
Classical Organizational Theory 
The tenets and assumptions of classical organizational theory are rooted 
in the British Industrial Revolution of the 1700s (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). Classical 
organizational theory is comprised of three distinct aspects identified as 
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bureaucratic, scientific, management. The examination of bureaucratic aspects 
embedded within public government agencies reveals barriers that must be 
addressed in order to deliver efficient communicative interoperability between 
and among all levels of law enforcement. These tenants evolved and expanded 
over three centuries to provide insight into the philosophy of government agency 
management, as well as to explain the philosophical tenants that govern 
communicative strategy. Classical organizational theory described the manner in 
which organizations maximize efficiency and productivity in all aspects of service 
delivery, including communication networks.  
The classical organizational model is connected to aspects implicit in all 
types of organizations, including police organizations (Radalet & Carter, 1994). 
Organizational theorists believed productive service methods could be 
determined via scientific inquiry, which studied specific work processes in order 
to systematically streamline tasks to maximize effectiveness (Shafritz & Ott, 
2001). Organizational theory could be utilized to determine the most efficient way 
to deliver services in an organizational environment (Gulick, 1937; March & 
Simon, 1958; Simon, 2000; F. Taylor, 1911; Weber, 1978).  
Study of Bureaucratic Organizations 
Weber’s (1978) work on bureaucracy defined the manner in which future 
public agencies communicate and organize resources. Stark (2004) defined 
bureaucracy as “the existence of a specialized administrative staff” (p. 38). 
Weber stated bureaucracy involved a particular type of administrative structure 
developed through legitimized authority and supported by strict discipline. The 
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goal of a bureaucratic organization was to increase organizational efficiency, 
which allowed for the expansion of organizational services. Weber’s bureaucratic 
model advanced traditional organizational structures, and Weber believed 
jurisdictional areas should be clearly specified, with specific instructions assigned 
from superiors. Each task is perfected through the repetition of process, which, 
over time, maximizes efficiency. Communication within the organization followed 
hierarchal principles in which subordinates were required to follow orders 
explicitly from their immediate supervisor, which created a narrow unity of 
command. Bureaucracy linked formal and informal communication networks that 
connected organizational actors to one another through information flows. 
Internal rules govern all decisions within the organization, and all decisions are 
recorded in permanent files to form a communicative framework (Weber, 1978).   
Historically, bureaucracy has been synonymous with large government 
agencies (Goodsell, 1983). Efficiency of communication in government agencies 
depends upon the efficient utilization of bureaucracy. The presence of 
bureaucracy creates both opportunities for sharing information and barriers to the 
implementation of new networks between federal and local agencies. Just as 
improved federal and local relations underlie an improved counterterrorism effort, 
information sharing is predicated on the improved construction and utilization of 
bureaucratic structures. The process of managing and controlling bureaucracy is 
an important first step in the implementation of any new government initiatives 
(Goodsell, 1983). 
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Daniels (2009) stated bureaucracy has evolved to represent the 
collectivity of government offices (called bureaus by officials) which comprised 
the permanent governance of the state. The term bureaucracy encompasses all 
public positions in public administration. Included are federal, state, and local 
members of both supervisory and line status, including officials who are both 
elected and appointed. The creation of improved interagency information sharing 
practices for the purpose of preventing domestic terrorist attacks is one of the 
critical aspects of current public policy initiatives involving the application of 
bureaucracy. Weber’s (1978) bureaucratic theory contained practical 
organizational element, applicable to addressing serious social problems, such 
as domestic terrorism. However, scholars have historically viewed bureaucracy 
as a barrier to implementation and not as a blueprint for efficient public 
organizations (Benson & Rosenberg, 1960; Hummel, 1977; Merton, 1990; G. 
Peters, 2001). 
Classical Organizational Theory and Scientific Management 
Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911) provided a significant amount of literature 
regarding the scientific component of classical organizational theory. Taylor 
theorized the application of scientific management could produce an efficient 
organization through dedication to a one best way approach. The process 
inherently demanded the meticulous assessment of every detail in the delivery of 
service. Taylor believed strict adherence to scientific management theory served 
as a prerequisite to organizational efficiency from the standpoint of minimizing 
waste while maximizing productivity. Each step was refined until a preferred 
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method was acknowledged as organizational benchmark procedure. For these 
reasons, scientific management, specifically the one best way approach, was 
employed from a strategic perspective by a majority of private businesses and 
public agencies at the turn of the 20th century, including police organizations 
(Palmiotto, 2000, p. 111). 
Scientific management also addresses communicative techniques, which 
can disseminate the most efficient, timely, and accurate information possible. 
Currently, no unified scientific management approach exists that allows law 
enforcement agencies to share information within a singular network. Moreover, 
an interoperable system, operating within the proscribed one best way approach, 
does not exist, which connects the federal, state, and law enforcement together 
for counterterrorism tasks of emergency response or for counterterrorism 
investigative purposes.  
The 9/11 Commission determined the federal government in conjunction 
with state and local departments lacked a unified strategy for the sharing of 
intelligence information (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The 
result in the decade following 9/11 has been a fragmented, disjointed, process, 
where each state in conjunction with participating local law enforcement entered 
into separate agreements with the federal government. The federal government 
waited, whether by choice or by bureaucratic inaction, to determine which 
individual state and local plans possessed merit before attempting to commit to a 
comprehensive strategic plan on a national level.  
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Relyea (2004) labeled the government’s approach to information sharing 
as a flawed strategy consisting of bureaucratic fiefdoms, a veritable patchwork of 
agencies from all levels. The lack of a unified strategy resulted in a hodgepodge 
of laws, regulations, and initiative strategies scattered among all levels of law 
enforcement. Principles of scientific management have not been applied to 
counterterrorism efforts, and the result is a disorganized approach fraught with 
widespread miscommunication.  
Taylor’s (1911) scientific management provided a potentially useful 
strategic blueprint from both continuity and efficiency standpoints involving 
information sharing practices. The 9/11 committee recommended a similar 
strategic approach, with a common set of standards applied to all levels of law 
enforcement. The 9/11 Commission recognized without a unified plan, the 
application of efficient modern technology would not be achieved, and 
government delivery of information sharing objectives would remain in serious 
jeopardy (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 23). 
Gulick (1937) developed a system within classical organizational theory 
that expanded Taylor’s (1911) scientific management theory while also 
contributing to the efficiency of overall police organizational work patterns. Gulick 
stated the efficiency of an organization lies within the division of labor of the 
members. The laborers are organized according to a unity of command structure 
where, as in the case of law enforcement, each officer reports up the chain of 
command to one designated supervisor. The consistent application of unity of 
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command results in more accurate and reliable information communication both 
between and among law enforcement agencies.  
Simon’s (2000) research on administration processes was considered by 
scholars to be a seminal work in the development of the administrative 
component of the classical organizational school of thought. Simon theorized 
administrative efficiency increased due to the specialization of group tasks. 
Group tasks arranged by supervisors comprised a strict hierarchy of authority 
model within the organization. Simon stated administrative efficiency increased 
by limiting the span of control at any point in the organizational hierarchy to a 
small number by grouping the workers, for purposes of control, purpose, place, 
and clientele (p. 39). 
Simon’s (2000) administrative efficiency concept was amplified by 
arranging the members of the group in a determinative structure of authority. 
Simon supported Gulick’s concept of unity of command, but cautioned that when 
tasks become highly specialized, a supervisor may not possess the necessary 
expertise to oversee a subordinate’s work. Simon concluded this principle could 
be utilized if presented in a truncated form. If two authoritative commands 
conflict, a single determinate person should be identified whom the subordinate 
is expected to obey (Simon, 2000, p. 43). 
The application of administrative theories of Gulick’s (1937) and Simon’s 
(2000) system provides a dilemma for local police administrators attempting to 
implement intelligence information sharing initiatives. Police labor practices must 
be specialized where individual line officers are knowledgeable and possess 
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skills necessary to conduct information sharing responsibilities. Local police 
officers must be trained to analyze and identify which information is important, 
and report the information within a predetermined strategic communicative 
structure. However, police counterterrorism labor must also be organized within 
an open communicative system because all officers within the agency could be 
knowingly or unknowingly in possession of critical terrorism investigation 
information. The attacks of 9/11 proved disjointed pieces of information could 
become critical when investigated in totality with other pieces of intelligence 
(Oliver, 2007). 
Classical Organizational Theory and Traditional Policing Management 
Traditional policing model of policing advances classical scientific 
management in three critical administrative areas. All three areas have a 
profound effect on communication between and among law enforcement 
agencies. As previously stated, police agencies and the application of scientific 
management techniques are concerned with efficiency and accuracy involving 
the communicative work product of a given organizational structure. Second, the 
application of traditional policing incorporates principles of the scientific method 
by which its application and practice can operate within rapidly expanding 
government bureaucracies. Finally, bureaucratic principles and scientific 
management practices are inherently reactive in nature. Policing strategy is 
generally approached from a micro viewpoint concerned with specific processes 
of police activity, not a comprehensive approach that connects organizations 
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together in order to address information sharing and counterterrorism strategy 
from a unified standpoint (Goldstein, 1990). 
Bureaucratic Models and Traditional Policing 
Perrow (1967) believed the bureaucratic model was applicable to police 
organizations at the micro level because most large local metropolitan police 
forces were shaped like a hierarchal pyramid. The pyramid structure was 
prohibitive to efficient communication in large departments because bureaucratic 
layers separated police administrators from line officers. Police organizations 
shared with the bureaucratic model a rigid chain of command, standard operating 
procedures whose purpose is to dictate protocol, and adherence to a military 
structure, including military titles and discipline. The organizational hierarchy 
dictated the communication flow since information traveled from the top to the 
bottom in a typical police chain of command structure. In regard to local law 
enforcement, a significant amount of administrative delay occurs as intelligence 
information travels upward through authority levels. Information traditionally has 
been shared from the top-down; for example, from the CIA, to the FBI, and on to 
state and local authorities.  
As noted in The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), prior to the Al Qaeda attacks, the intelligence 
information flow on all levels of law enforcement was inadequate. A top-down 
approach denigrates the value of information gathered by state and local 
authorities, which is imperative to counter-terrorist operations. The 9/11 
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Commission agreed improved information sharing practices can improve law 
enforcement communication by simultaneously managing bureaucracy while 
expediting decision-making processes. Therefore, it is critical for law 
enforcement agencies to distance themselves from the traditional hierarchal 
administration structure in favor of collaborative proactive processes, which 
includes seamless communication across all levels of law enforcement 
(Goldstein, 1987; Ratcliffe, 2003; Tilley, 2004). 
Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd (2004) stated Weber’s concept of 
authority was essential to the progression of police evolving from reactive to 
proactive organizations. Weber’s (1978) authority was prevalent in police 
agencies on the subject of rank hierarchy, as well as police work accountability. 
The hierarchal structures were similar to legal-rational authority principles 
espoused by Weber. Police supervisors exhibit legal rational authority over 
subordinates, and orders are communicated directly down the chain of command 
hierarchy. 
 Police agencies have employed many of Weber’s (1978) bureaucratic 
concepts, which has been a criticism for scholars questioning the outcomes of 
reactive styles of police service while simultaneously questioning the benefits 
bureaucracy can provide (Mastrofski, 1998). Bureaucracy has been scrutinized 
by scholars for the myriad of bureaucratic dysfunctions, the same type of 
criticism historically attributed to hierarchal public agencies. Goldstein (1979) 
stated, bureaucracy “places greater emphasis on their organization and 
operating methods within the organization, and less on the substantive outcome 
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of their work” (p. 236). Examples of bureaucratic dysfunction include the fixation 
on rules and regulations, and a pervasive clinical attitude unresponsive to 
societal problems (Eck & Newell, 1987; Mastrofski, 1998; Sparrow, Moore, & 
Kennedy, 1990; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1999). 
Kim and Bretschneider (2004) found bureaucracies operated most 
efficiently based upon an established pre-determined protocol of handling a 
specific investigative situation, which is why the study of bureaucracy and 
scientific management has been historically linked. By performing the same task 
in a repetitious manner, the framework for more efficient communication 
networks is established. Kim and Bretschneider reported strict adherence to 
internal rules (also referred to as standard operating procedures) significantly 
helped local agencies coordinate information. The development of standard 
operating procedures helps to minimize organizational interference, which 
operates as a barrier to communication. Coordinated protocol also contributed to 
an increase in human and non-human communication across state and federally 
controlled networks. The study concluded local police organizations were open to 
new initiatives, so long as the local bureaucracy maintains input on the delivery 
of services to its citizens. 
Traditional Policing and Reactivity 
Goldstein (1990) explained the managerial strategy of traditional policing 
revolved around reactive activities. The traditional method of policing was 
comprised of a group of core duties, such as routine patrol, keeping the peace, 
and arrest and report writing (Stone & DeLuca, 1994). The traditional 
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organizational philosophy, as it related to communication with other agencies, 
was severely restrictive and limited by design (Payne & Trojanowicz, 1985). 
These types of traditional police strategies developed as natural organizational 
barriers to the efficient flow of information sharing (Birzer & Tannehill, 2004). 
Few transformational ideas were introduced during the time period 
traditional policing tactics gained popularity in the United States. Police officers 
working in the traditional organizational structure believed the quickest way to 
promotion was to make arrests and to limit response time for the next call of 
service. Police officers in this era understood efficient patrol and discipline 
practices lead to more arrests, which lead to promotional opportunities for all 
officers involved in the organization (Goldstein, 1990). 
The traditional organizational relationship is opposite of the core 
management principles of law enforcement originally espoused by Sir Robert 
Peel, considered to be one of the most important contributors to the traditional 
method of policing (Radelet & Carter, 1994). Peel’s policing philosophies (as 
cited in Radelet & Carter, 1994) agreed with classical organization theorists from 
the standpoint that successful policing was based on efficiency and strict 
discipline. However, Peel (as cited in Radelet & Carter, 1994) believed efficiency 
could be improved with the application of an inclusive police philosophy, on 
which encouraged all. In addition, Peel (as cited in Radelet & Carter, 1994) 
believed in the solicitation of public support and cooperation from community 
members, considered to be a radical idea for the time period. 
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The 9/11 Commission and scholars concluded critical information sharing 
barriers, which limited efficiency, could not be solved by the application of 
reactive police management (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). 
The traditional model of police operations promoted a territorial organizational 
structure that facilitated communication gaps between and among the federated 
levels of law enforcement. Therefore, intelligence information could not be 
shared efficiently across all levels of federal, state, and local law enforcement. 
The traditional model was effective for core police activities, but lacked the 
comprehensive strategic procedures needed to evolve with additional 
opportunities provided by new technology (Ratcliffe, 2003). 
Weisburd and Eck (2004) stated traditional police tactics were not only 
inefficient and non-beneficial in traditional core policing areas but were 
incompatible with the application of new initiatives and types of police services 
that required additional officers. The isolation of individual officers and agencies 
hindered the development of cooperative initiatives between and among levels of 
law enforcement. The study concluded this type of management procedure 
operated as a natural barrier to efficient police services.  
Walker (1993) stated security incidents were treated as if occurred in a 
vacuum, an isolated occurrence never to be re-investigated. The lack of 
coordination and analytical opportunities for capability provided by the traditional 
method left police members and the community questioning whether police 
operations, as it existed in its traditional form, were capable of ensuring public 
safety. Tilley (2004) agreed with Walker who coined the traditional approach, “fire 
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brigade policing” (p. 165), warning of the dangers of single case investigation. 
The preferred communicative manner would be to link all pieces of information 
together in one large database, which could be used for primary and follow-up 
investigations. A comprehensive approach would increase communication with 
other agencies and allow police to operate in a manner which would strategically 
aid long term objectives. 
Modern Structural Organization Theory-Proactive Police Communication 
In an attempt to reconcile the differences between the traditional and 
proactive styles of police management, Burns and Stalker (1994) developed a 
majority of the tenants of Modern Structure Theory. Modern structure theory 
explored how the two organizational forms interrelated to form an efficient 
organizational environment. Burns and Stalker believed both reactive and 
proactive styles had a place in a given organizational structure, because each 
style had the potential to benefit an organization depending upon the goals and 
services provided.  
Burns and Stalker (1994) framed the discussion as the mechanical 
organization structure versus the organic structure. This debate served as a 
template for the efficient management of all types of organizations, including the 
modernization of police services. The tenants of modern structural theory are 
similar to classical organizational theory, but also included neoclassical 
components of human relations with the inclusion of several additional 
assumptions.  
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Burns and Stalker (1994) stated the most efficient structure of an 
organization lies in its objective and natural environmental condition as dictated 
by its products and services. Most fundamental problems can be attributed to the 
organizational structure, and can be solved by changing the structure. The best 
structure of an organization should be determined, in part, by the technological 
process involved in the organizational delivery of goods and services (Shafritz & 
Ott, 2001). 
Burns and Stalker (1994) believed the organic nature of management 
systems could be applied to modern business processes. The concept of organic 
organizations was synonymous with proactive police policy, making it compatible 
with government services operating in rapidly changing societal conditions. The 
organic system offered an organization less rigidity, which made the system 
adaptable and easily reconciled with the latest technological advancements. The 
process involved increased participation and reliance on the workers within the 
organizational structure. The organic structure was based upon information and 
the networking of information rather than merely following directives issued by 
superiors. 
A precise definition of community policing has been stated vaguely in the 
literature and the subject of much debate among both scholars and practitioners. 
Leonard and More (1978) defined community policing as a vague term that 
encompassed a broad range of police activities and initiatives. Adams et al. 
(2002) and Skogan (2004) explained community policing consisted of an 
organizational formula of elements, including organizational decentralization, 
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problem- solving, and community involvement. Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines, 
and Bucqueroux (1998) described the definition of community policing as a form 
of police service based on a strategic alliance of citizens and police to solve 
contemporary societal problems. These attributes were comprised of 
components necessary for the potential advancement of information sharing 
initiatives within the organizational parameters of community policing practices 
(e.g., Bayley, 1988; Cordner, 1978; Goldstein, 1990; Greene & Mastrofski, 1988; 
Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Skogan, 2004; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Skolnick & 
Bayley,1986; Sparrow et al., 1990; Trojanowicz et al., 1998; Wilson, 2006). 
Hickman and Reaves (2001) stated community policing gained 
acceptance from police professionals as both an innovative and efficient way to 
deliver police services. Beginning in 1984, over 150 agencies utilized a form of 
community policing strategy. In 1994, 42% used some aspect of community 
policing. In 2001, at the time of the 9/11 attack over 92% of police agencies used 
a form of community policing in an effort to inform the public and maintain public 
vigilance regarding domestic terrorist activities. 
Gaffigan, Roth, and Buerger (2000) described the advantages of 
community policing strategy as a potential strategic organizational structure for 
information sharing initiatives. An additional benefit of the community policing 
strategy was the merger of law enforcement interagency and community 
cooperation to provide effective and efficient police services. The tenants of 
community oriented and proscribed consultation with community groups 
regarding local security needs and command reorganization. After consultation, a 
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determination could be made regarding how best to respond to the situation. 
Through collaborative process, law enforcement could increase connectivity with 
the community for the purpose of the reduction of crime through problem-solving 
tactics. 
Wilson (2006) stated the natural relationship between the police and 
community made the two entities natural crime fighting partners. The police relied 
on the community to report crime and share information necessary to address 
community concerns and solve societal problems. In turn, the community relied 
on the police to assist in public emergencies and help curb disorder. Wilson 
believed the community was more receptive to the development of proactive 
practices because of the catastrophic nature of domestic terrorism. Since 9/11, 
most communities accepted the challenge and responsibility of working with 
police in this cause, but were reciprocally demanding more informational access 
and transparent police organizations.  
Skogan and Frydl (1999) stated innovations in information technology 
allowed local police agencies to increase levels of communicative interactivity. 
These innovations provided police the opportunity to access different types of 
intelligence information more accurately and efficiently. Local police have been 
able to increase the coverage of assigned patrol grids, with real-time 
communication from agency response command centers, which increases 
intelligence capacity. This example of proactive practice allowed police more 
visibility and access within the community while simultaneously increasing patrol 
efficiency. The advancements in the physical and technological capacity enabled 
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law enforcement to make technological advancements in all types of electronic 
recordkeeping (Kelling, 1994). 
Skogan and Hartnett (1997) added community policing allowed police 
agencies to decentralize services and reorganize patrol assignments to include a 
wider breadth of services. The community policing approach offered increased 
opportunities for sharing information and for increased police services to include 
domestic terrorism prevention. Cordner, Gaines, and Kappeler (1996) stated the 
goal of community policing was to change the process in which police services 
were delivered, and directly attack the barriers associated with federated law 
enforcement organizational structure. Community policing initiatives accelerated 
the transition of police services to a proactive, participative style that encouraged 
information sharing partnerships among all levels of law enforcement. The 
community policing strategy would, in effect, deputize all members of the 
community in the prevention of domestic terrorism, instead of the traditional 
models of policing where police operated without the cooperation of the 
community. 
McPherson (2007) agreed community policing will be successful if 
operational strategies that facilitate proactive policing can be utilized. McPherson 
stated community policing has several philosophical applications to intelligence 
information sharing, which can be constituted by transforming both the 
organization as well as individual officers working in the organization. By taking 
this approach, police services would be expanded to include domestic terrorism 
prevention. Community policing also addressed problems not associated with 
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traditional police tasks. Most importantly, community policing contributed to an 
increase in the amount of information sharing partnerships above the local level.  
Fridell (2004) stated in a study conducted by the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF) that community policing increased the amount of 
information sharing partnerships within the community and, additionally, 
facilitated partnerships between all levels of law enforcement. Kelling and Coles 
(1996) added the philosophy of community policing was an ideal complement to 
the implementation information sharing because of its shared proactive nature 
that enlisted the help of the community. Community policing programs originally 
were implemented for the purpose of helping local police organizations distance 
themselves from traditional, militaristic styles of police operation. The purpose 
was to facilitate a new era of proactive police operations where the public viewed 
local police departments as pro community and community friendly (Bayley, 
1988; Chappell, 2009; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).  
Skogan, Hartnett, Du Bois, Comey, and Lovig (1999) believed traditional 
police activities combined with proactive policing techniques resulted in the 
growth of community policing initiatives. For example, the creation of police 
substations within local communities increased communication between the 
public and police. However, local police learned citizen involvement was not 
enough to ensure successful and consistent communicative interaction. Skogan 
(1994) stated police have learned community involvement in all programs must 
be constantly evaluated, and even with competent management, is difficult to 
maintain:  
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One of my conclusions drawn from the Chicago evaluation study is the 
difficult in sustaining autonomous citizen action, even with the support of 
local police. Organizations develop agendas that keep their energies 
focused, even when key leaders tire or turn their attention to other 
priorities. Local police agencies provide a focus for identification and 
commitment to the program initiatives they choose to pursue. Local police 
provide social benefits to participants which require constant attention. (p. 
32)  
McPherson (2007) stated one of the barriers of community and police 
relations was the organization and delegation of duties between police and the 
community. Organizational barriers remained, which made organizational 
transformation to a proactive strategy difficult to integrate. Not every community 
in the United States is willing to commit the resources necessary for additional 
policing initiatives. Participating individual community members have reciprocally 
demanded access to all types of police crime information. Community members, 
in turn, demanded more openness from law enforcement, which previously 
monopolized intelligence information. 
Zhao, Thurman, and Reis (2008) suggested one of the unintended 
barriers of the proactive community policing style as it relates to information 
technology is it places more emphasis on communication within the agency and 
less within the community. Community policing tactics can rectify this situation by 
increasing contact with citizens. These contacts have contributed to an increase 
in both quality and amount of accruable intelligence. Gaines, Kappeler, and 
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Vaughn (1997) stated local police historically focused on the reduction of crime 
and local police interest in information technology traditionally revolved around 
this task. Information technology had assisted police with pursuing, monitoring, 
and arresting suspects. Traditional police procedure dictates the police receive 
information from interagency sources, and less from entities outside the agency. 
Environmental Characteristics 
Social Exchange Theory 
Premkumar, Ramamurthy, and Nilakanta (1994) stated social exchange 
theory has provided the foundation for the study of relationships between 
organizations. Social exchange theory borrowed from several theory bases 
including, but not limited to, transaction cost theory, political economy theory, and 
power and politics organizational theories. The literature in this research area 
specifically explored the concepts of power and trust.  
 Social exchange theory has been utilized to explain why organizations 
choose to cooperate and participate with one another based upon non-economic 
benefits. Son, Narashiman, and Riggins (1999) stated organizations’ collective 
behavior will be determined by the responses to other organizations throughout 
the business relationship cycle. Public agencies covet resources based upon a 
dichotomy of power and dependence. Each agency covets resources that could 
not be acquired without interagency cooperation. 
Social exchange theory was originally developed by Homans (1950, 
1974). Homans (1950, 1974) believed communication between two organizations 
was most likely to occur when both sides acknowledge the benefits of 
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exchanging resources. Homans (1974) stated an exchange of information is 
eminent if both organizations mutually recognize the benefits of the relationship. 
Social exchange theory was cited as one of the primary theories used by 
researchers to explain why public agencies choose to participate in new 
cooperative partnerships. 
Social exchange theory analyzed strategic partnerships based on the 
possession (also referred to as power) and dependency of organizational 
resources. Aldrich (1976) defined power as a characteristic which offered 
agencies the opportunity for greater access to informational resources. Unlike 
power, dependency is perceived by the public sector as an undesirable 
organizational quality, which could result in downsizing or elimination. Public 
organizations that become dependent on other organizations for resources are 
perceived as inferior and are vulnerable to consolidation or elimination. The 
placement of these agencies within the overall organizational structure of the 
government affects the agency’s ability to control scarce resources. In turn, the 
flow of resources from organization to organization allows each to expand, 
contract, dissolve, and reform as leaders deem necessary. 
Benson (1975) defined relationships between organizations in terms of 
political economy. The term political economy is defined as the dispersal of 
scarce resources (information), which allows for a system of power relations 
(networks) to develop between individual organizations, which allow for the 
excursion of power (external influence) on one another. To that effect, a 
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significant amount of literature has focused on the power—dependence 
dichotomy of organizations.  
The literature contains several seminal works involving organizational 
administration theory, which described the strategic advantages public agencies 
seek when engaged in cooperative initiatives with other organizations. Based on 
an empirical study of 22 voluntary and governmental health-related agencies, 
Levine and White (1961) defined exchange as a conceptual framework that 
offered more latitude to the narrow definition developed by Homans (1972) in his 
research involving small groups. Levine and White stated, “organizational 
exchange is any voluntary activity between two organizations which has 
consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals 
or objectives” (p. 22). Although Levine and White defined exchange within the 
context of long range time frames and with unequally empowered organizations, 
the conclusion was that organizations aspired to maximize power within their 
organization while limiting dependency on other organizations. 
Levine and White (1961) cited the necessity for interorganizational 
cooperation due to resource, labor, or client scarcity, and defined the degree of 
interdependence between such organizations as a function of its access outside 
the organizational structure. Levine and White framed the dimensions of 
exchange in terms of the parties involved, kinds and quantities of entities traded 
(i.e., resources, information), nature of the agreement underlying the 
cooperation, and the consistency of organizational definitions. 
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The second study is Litwak and Hylton’s (1962) treatment of the role of 
coordinating agencies at the local level. Litwak and Hylton evaluated three 
factors that comprised a matrix of the type of mechanisms designed to achieve 
coordination between two or more agencies. The study relied on the assumption 
that political conflict exists between agencies in the public sector because 
organizations aspire to achieve a maximum level of autonomy. The three 
variables tested were partial interdependence, awareness of interdependence, 
and transactions capable of being defined in standardized units of action. Litwak 
and Hylton focused on the study of interorganizational relations within the context 
of unstructured authority, and later compared and contrasted unstructured 
authority in terms of international relations between two governments. 
Guetzkow’s (1962) study described three ways in which organizations 
interact with one another. The interactions were identified as interpenetration of 
partnerships, specialized roles of interaction across organizations, and 
interactions through supraorganizational processes. The study was relevant to 
criminal justice in that it involved the utilization of joint committees and task 
forces. Roberts (2006) stated task forces traditionally have been the preferred 
strategic method for sharing information across all levels of law enforcement. 
Guetzkow identified both power and dependency relationships in which 
coordination could be operationally accomplished through power and 
dependency models. Guetzkow believed interaction between agencies could be 
demonstrated through tacit coordination through consensus, domination by one 
organization over another, and the establishment of new organizational entities 
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through initiatives. Guetzkow agreed with Levine and White’s (1961) exchange-
based model from the standpoint each organization assists the other toward 
mutual goals in the course of service initiatives. 
Bureaucracy of Individual and Organizational Social Interaction 
A large section of bureaucratic literature involves the examination of the 
individual worker’s interaction within the larger organizational structure. The 
individual relationships are found in the social exchanges between individuals in 
their own departments, relationships with other law enforcement agencies, as 
well as the relationship of workers within their overall organizational environment. 
Lipsky (1980) stated at its core the routines, simplifications, and environments of 
street-level workers are inherently political (p. 84). Work product often is altered 
by worker biases, which are determined by worker motivations of self-interest as 
well as the interest of clients they are entrusted to serve. Street-level workers, in 
effect, exchange the manner in which they perform their designated duties for 
personal benefit and career benefit as well as for benefit of others of which they 
are politically aligned.  
Nonet and Selznick (2001) stated that bureaucratic organizations through 
examination of their hierarchical organizational structure tend to promote the 
institutionalization of individual work patterns found in a public bureaucracy. 
Selznick introduced a relevant definition of an institution, which is applicable to 
information sharing. Selznick’s research defined institutionalization as “the 
emergence of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely 
organized, or narrowly technical activities” (Nonet & Selznick, 2001, p. 272). 
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Selznick stated the stabilization of individual patterns as well as the individual 
worker’s dedication to following the rules and regulation contained within the 
proscribed work patterns will be contributing determinants to the outcome of any 
given public policy. 
Merton (1990) introduced the concept of the “bureaucratic personality,” in 
which officials follow “ritualistic or extremely rigid behavior that detracts from 
efficiency” (Merton, 1990, p. 141). The essential feature of this personality is “the 
displacement of goals whereby an instrumental value (e.g., efficiency or 
adherence to procedure) becomes a terminal value” (Merton, 1990, p. 141).  
Downs (1967) offered a comprehensive review of the subject of 
bureaucracy as it relates to innovation with his presentation of the laws of 
increasing conservatism, imperfect control, counter control, and control 
duplication (Goodsell, 1983; Nachmias & Rosenbloom, 1980; Nigro, 1970). 
Levitan (2001) demonstrated how the institutional approach employed in 
bureaucracies may ultimately affect decisions made by individual workers. 
Goodsell (1983) agreed that an overly narrow emphasis on more narrow 
objectives, such as procedure or efficiency, might engender a lack of concern for 
broader agency goals.  
Research by Warner (2007) and Kohn (1971) placed the correlation 
between bureaucracy and bureaucrats and behavioral traits, such as 
conservatism, goal displacement, and narrow-mindedness, into question. The 
findings from studies conducted by Warner and Kohn appeared to contradict 
Merton’s (1990) notion of the bureaucratic personality. The bureaucrat of Kohn’s 
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type values self-direction, open-mindedness, and flexibility. Kohn suggested that 
within the structure provided by a bureaucracy, administrators may find 
themselves more free to peruse new initiatives than their counterparts in non-
bureaucratic organizations (Goodsell, 1983; Wilson, 2006). Peters (2001) also 
observed “tension . . . between the role of the bureaucracy as advocates of 
innovation in policies and their role as conservers of procedures” (p. 225). The 
dichotomy between these two objectives appears to gravitate back and forth as 
public servants interacting with bureaucracies adapt and respond to external 
pressures both from within their own organization politicians and constituents. 
Lipsky (1980) offered several tenets applicable to understanding the 
manner in which bureaucracy functions within public sector agencies of the 
United States government. One of the similarities between street bureaucracy 
and homeland security policy is that both seek the implementation of a strategic 
framework (from an individual worker perspective), which operates from the 
bottom to the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Lipsky explained how the 
informal communication network between and among public agencies both 
evolves and operates within public bureaucratic layers. Lipsky unequivocally 
stated that power in American public bureaucracy continues to shift towards 
street-level workers who, among other tasks, are increasingly working in 
positions critical to public safety. Street-level workers, not group supervisors or 
upper-level administrators, are directly responsible for successful individual 
outcomes in all types of public agencies. 
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Lipsky (1980) stated police officers, on a macro level, learn to navigate 
between formal and informal policies set forth in their respective agencies, and 
the interpretation of both formal and informal policies becomes part of police 
culture. All aspects of job processes are analyzed, including the effect of street-
level bureaucracy on communicative processes between and among agencies as 
well as the efficiency of which their particular bureaucracy operates. One of the 
integral ways individual public workers become powerful within a public 
bureaucracy is by their ability to ration public service resources in the probable 
event of scarcity. Information, particularly credible tips from informants, is 
perhaps the most valuable investigative tool police officers possess. Street-level 
police officers determine the flow of information up the chain of command by 
choosing to withhold or release privileged information. This situation allows 
street-level police the opportunity, if desired, to manipulate the system for 
individual benefit.   
For example, Lipsky (1980) pointed out the suppression of information 
leads to lighter police officer caseloads and paperwork. Officers know that when 
information is sent up the chain of command, they will be responsible for 
providing follow-up investigations and reports. Therefore, street-level agents may 
choose to put up roadblocks, such as offering a confusing litany of regulations 
and guidelines as to how citizens can report terror information. This type of 
conduct would theoretically reduce the number of credible citizen tips over a 
period of time. 
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Lipsky (1980) stated communicative efficiency, like all types of efficiency, 
develops from an ongoing process that involves the simplification of routines. 
Lipsky was specifically interested in the structuring of routines as well as the 
copious examination of the contexts found within work routines. Lipsky believed 
that the determination of routines by street-level public servants would lead to the 
eventual formation of coherent and efficient public policy. 
Lipsky (1980) also pointed out the evolvement of public policy is never 
predetermined. In terms of measuring departmental efficiency, it may lead to 
increased or decreased levels depending on the beliefs and biases of the 
individual workers involved. The worker will act autonomously to the policies 
already set forth by his or her employer and may choose a certain course of 
action regardless of individual positive or negative views of information sharing. 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) added to the work of Lipsky (1980) 
by suggesting that although discretion is an interregnal component of the job of 
the street-level worker, discretion can diverge into two distinct paths: as an agent 
for the individual citizen or as an agent for the state. Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno believe discretion, at its core, is the attempt of a public servant to 
reconcile their responsibility as both a state and citizen agent. Both narratives are 
not mutually exclusive, and experimentation continues until the public servant 
settles through their work experiences and determines the preferable course of 
action. 
The individual narrative suggests public servants will base work decisions 
on what they believe to be the value of the clients they serve. According to 
52 
 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000), this type of public service agent will 
respond exclusively to individuals and circumstances. The service agents do not 
describe themselves as public policy implementers or contributors. They do not 
describe their decisions and actions based on the views of correctness of the 
rules, wisdom of the policy, or accountability to any hierarchical authority or 
democratic principal (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000, p. 329). 
Contrary to the citizen-agent, the state-agent narrative suggests public 
servants will be influenced primarily by self-interest throughout the course of their 
duties. The street agent will be guided by the path of least resistance as well as 
the opportunity to make their work duties safer, easier, and more rewarding. The 
street-level narrative suggests these workers are potentially informal policy 
makers, yet many carry an honest concern over the impact their discretion has 
on the system as a whole (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000, p. 329). 
External Influence: Incentives 
External influence can take the form of encouragement or pressure and 
can vary from recommendations, requests, or the imposition of penalties. In order 
to create a climate for successful information sharing, a reward or punishment 
system can be utilized. Markus and Keil (1994) believed if new government 
systems are not reinforced by monetary incentives, the initiatives are likely to fail. 
Similarly, Garfield (2000) agreed that without adequate financial support and 
oversight, federal systems were less likely to succeed.  
Bingham (1976) explained that intergovernmental grants, transfers, and 
technical assistance contribute to the adoption of innovations by local 
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governments that are critical to the process of information sharing. Bingham 
agreed that government agencies providing the grants design them in a way that 
the other agency seeking the grant should take action in the desired fashion. 
Electronic information sharing requires the participation of several stakeholders, 
and such sharing can promote conflicts of interest within the overall organization.  
Chess (2001) explained organizational entities that enter into business 
contracts with one another are habitually influenced by external forces. Likewise, 
external influences are a critical variable to the successful implementation of any 
information sharing program. The creation and development of information 
sharing programs is strategically assessed as a necessary survival mechanism. 
Chess (2001) and Chess, Salonlone, and Hence (1995) suggested that in order 
for organizations to enhance information sharing efforts, an evaluation is needed 
to assess both the process and the outcomes of potential initiatives. Researchers 
cited intergovernmental influence as a significant factor in the adoption of 
innovations by participating agencies (Chess, 2001; Leiss, 1996).  
Trust 
The research literature offers a variety of suggestions for overcoming the 
organizational barrier of trust. As a result, some common themes emerge which 
may overcome barriers and further assist in the development of information 
sharing initiatives. Interagency trust has been a perennial barrier and has been 
difficult to achieve and maintain in law enforcement because of political 
pressures, the presence of territoriality, and frequent jurisdictional disputes. The 
benefit of building trust in the public arena is viewed as a precursor for increased 
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communication as well as the improvement of communication protocols. Trust 
has gained importance for law enforcement agencies as new information sharing 
initiatives are formed. It is considered by both academics and practitioners to be 
a crucial first step for the delivery of public services (Leiss, 1996; Sjoberg, 2002).  
Trust has been identified by scholars as a fundamental element for 
developing communicative networks between agencies. Research has 
suggested that trust is a precursor for communicative openness, facilitates 
commitment between agencies, and encourages cooperation. From a purely 
organizational standpoint, trust refers to the belief law enforcement agencies will 
engage in actions that will result in partnerships which lead to positive outcomes 
for all participating agencies. Peters, Covello, and McCallum (1997) identified 
variables closely correlated to trust as openness, concern, and a desire to 
increase knowledge. 
Dawes (1996) stated trust is a fundamental precursor for sharing 
information. This statement especially is applicable to intelligence information 
available only through security clearance. The facilitation of trust provides 
members of public agencies with an optimistic anticipation of the interaction, and 
the belief information will be utilized for the benefit of all involved agencies. 
Dawes believed the absence of trust inherently limits government initiatives and 
increases bureaucratic red tape and administrative delay. Dawes stressed the 
importance of explaining the benefits of sharing information to agency 
supervisors prior to the attempted integration of new initiatives. 
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 Landsbergen and Wolken (2001) stated a lack of trust among public 
agencies causes each agency to ultimately collect its own information, resulting 
in increased bureaucracy and duplication. Danzinger (1979) stated an 
information bias occurs for information acquired outside the scope of the 
originating agency. The national research council stated trust between agencies 
is directly correlated with the accuracy of information exchanged, legal standing 
between the government agencies involved, and the amount of information that 
needs to be verified with other government sources. 
Organizational Culture Theory 
Organizational culture theory is relevant to information sharing because an 
investigation of police subculture reveals inherent barriers to communication. 
Trice and Beyer (1993) stated all public and private organizations contain 
cultures resistant to change. Organizational change theory involved the 
examination of police subculture to determine which aspects of police subculture 
act as barriers to the implementation of information sharing networks. New 
initiatives can become future values to an organization if members of the 
organization can be persuaded to support the proposed change.  
Trice and Bayer (1993) also stated the transformation of an organizational 
culture is universally problematic because dominant values in mature 
organizations are slow to change. Organizations that seek meaningful change 
must redefine their organizational culture, which includes written policies, 
protocols, and procedures. This must be accompanied by individual member 
change in the areas of values and belief systems. Organizational changes need 
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to be introduced slowly through a combination of voluntary retirement, employee 
turnover, and in-house training, which over time represents a generation of 
workers within an organization.  
Morgan (1998) explained culture is derived from the word “cultivation,” 
which was attributed to “the process of tilling and developing land” (p. 112). The 
process of cultivation is obtained from the identification of patterns associated 
with different forms (Morgan, 1998). Morgan identifies the various forms as 
values, knowledge, and protocol, which over time are considered routine 
procedure. These routines are components of a larger social system found in 
mature organizations, such as law enforcement agencies.  
Scholars utilized organizational culture theory, in part, because by 
examining the patterns of behavior passed down from groups of workers over a 
period of time, a baseline of behavior develops. Behavior can be compared to the 
proposed new ideas (communication of information through proactive police 
service) so that it can be measured in an organization. Shein (1996) defined 
organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that a group 
learns as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration” (p. 
34). These tenants operated efficiently enough to be considered valid, over time, 
and therefore taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to organizational work problems (Shein, 1996, pp. 373-374). 
 The protocol and knowledge passed generationally from one group of 
workers to the next is passed through three tenants of organizational culture 
theory defined as artifacts, values, and basic assumptions. Shein (1996) defined 
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artifacts as “visible organizational structures and processes which are easy to 
depict, but difficult to decipher” (p. 17). An example of an artifact in a police 
organization is the side of a patrol car which reads, “to protect and to serve” 
(Shein, 1996, p. 14). This example is a symbol of police power and the image of 
police as the good guys. The artifact contains cultural significance for each 
member as accepted pursuit and practice of police organizational goals. Manning 
(1997) stated these images serve as a powerful force behind the establishment 
of a culture of a police agency and of the image of individual members working 
within the agency.  
Rank and file officer values and belief systems comprise the backbone of 
police organizations (Trojanowicz et al., 1998; Walker, 1993). The values and 
assumptions developed by line officers through experience on the job is essential 
to information sharing, but also a potential barrier to planned organizational 
change. Line officers’ views and ultimately support of change is imperative 
because rank and file officers are entrusted with the delivery of all new strategic 
initiatives. Specifically, line officers are more likely to confront potential terrorists 
than any other position in a police organization (Crank, 1998). However, patrol 
officers are at the bottom of the power hierarchy in a traditional police 
organizational chart, and police strategy does not originate from the bottom, 
which tends to stifle innovation among members (Angell, 1976). New policing 
practices need to be implemented, which allow inclusion of line officer 
participation in a proactive organizational system. 
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Line Officer Support 
Chappell (2009) suggested administrators can alter police subculture, and 
thus increase support of new programs through a combination of recruitment, 
education, and training. However, the rate of change in any organization is 
predicated based on positive worker perception of the changes before support 
can be given. The changes must be of career benefit to every member of the 
organization. The proscribed changes must involve new work activities that 
support perceived officer strengths, so officers know their skills can contribute to 
new procedures. Change needs to be executed in an expedient fashion so 
workers can see the positive effects of changes as they are implemented. 
Chappell stated the efficacy of change is an important consideration because of 
historical police organizational resistance to police innovations of any meaningful 
magnitude. The examination of police officer attitudes is important to proactive 
police practices, such as community information sharing initiatives, because prior 
research has indicated attitudes are strongly correlated to behavior (Engel & 
Worden, 2003). 
The transition from a traditional to a community paradigm within an 
organization brings a new set of values and basic assumptions to the police job 
description. New initiatives must be developed to guide officers through the 
process of sharing information with other law enforcement agencies before 
officers will support new processes. Line officers must be trained to contribute to 
new initiatives with the investigative, analytical, and technical skills needed to 
efficiently share information with federal law enforcement agencies. For example, 
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leading a neighborhood meeting where intelligence information is gleaned, 
networking with police officers in other agencies, or providing analytical analysis 
of a terrorist threat and reporting the threat via computer, all are critical office 
activities towards the implementation of information sharing initiatives. This type 
of comprehensive change requires years of work in order to change the values 
and belief systems of individuals who are used to performing daily activities using 
fundamentally different police protocol (McPherson, 2007). 
Sadd and Grinc (1994) described the recruitment of line officer support of 
new initiatives as a battle for the hearts and minds of all involved. A significant 
barrier exists to transform police employees selected, trained, and socialized to 
perform one task, and then instruct police officers to perform in a manner which 
fundamentally changes operation protocol. If information sharing initiatives are to 
succeed, supervisors must persuade line officers to believe that information 
sharing initiatives will benefit all levels of careers within the organization. 
Supervisors must sell new innovations that will enhance willingness to pursue 
goals associated within in a proactive manner consistent with implementing 
information sharing practices.  
Internal Pressure 
Schermerhorn, Hunt, and Osborn (1994) stated a barrier to organizational 
innovation is tension between line level employees and their supervisors. A 
benefit of proactive police strategy is the improvement of relationships due to an 
increased element of line level participation with supervisors in organizational 
decision-making. Reuss-Ianni (1983) stated a proactive approach bridges 
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potential divides within the two groups and increases overall organizational 
communication. McDonnell (2002) agreed, “communication between two groups 
in the same organization is a social affair involving the sharing of information. 
The emphasis of proactive management relations is in the sharing aspect of 
communication” (p. 406). 
Crank (1998) stated many of the disagreements between line officer and 
supervisors could be eliminated by increasing the levels of communication within 
an agency. Blau (1963) stated a lack of aligned strategy as well as the traditional 
division of labor and management within the organization ultimately contributes 
to communication breakdown. Line officers often misinterpret the purpose behind 
supervisor decisions, and supervisors believe certain officers may not be 
following previously established police protocol. 
The division between supervisors and line staff serve as a barrier to 
communication problems. One of the causes of communication breakdown 
inherent to the police subculture is secrecy. Westley (1953) stated secrecy is a 
dangerous value embraced by police subculture. However, secrecy generally is 
not considered by line officers to be a negative police subculture trait. Secrecy 
has evolved as an honorable trait for a police officer within the organization. 
Westley stated the police subculture equates secrecy or non-communication with 
solidarity, loyalty, and trust. Secrecy and silence are the first rules impressed on 
a new recruit. Thus, scholars focused on ethical over investigative considerations 
that have negatively impacted local departments in the last century, such as 
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corruption and use of force (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert 1998; Lersch, 2002; 
Skolnick, 1994; Stevens, 1999; Weisburd & Greenspan, 2000).  
Westley (1953) stated police are encouraged by members of their own 
agency to keep investigations in house for both the benefit of the agency and for 
self-preservation. If line police elect to circumvent the established chain of 
command protocol, the action is considered disloyal. The irony is officers who 
leak information are punished by an informal future restriction of information 
regarding other investigations. The result is the individual officers’ access to 
information within the department is severely restricted; hindering his or her 
ability to make cases, and decreasing the possibility of promotion within the 
department.  
Manning (1997) stated the willingness to share information with 
unapproved entities either inside or outside the agency conflicts with what Weber 
described as “official secrets” (p. 227). Official secrets are defined as information 
and knowledge that accumulate over time and grow with experience of service. 
Police subculture dictates that information equates power, and police are 
reluctant to relinquish, including other police officers or members of the public 
(Weber, 1978).  
Willis et al. (2004) observed in their case study involving officers in Lowell, 
Massachusetts that a limited amount of information sharing between officers in 
the same department was taking place, which is necessary to solve societal 
problems such as terrorism. Willis et al. believed information sharing was limited 
due to the expectation of supervisors, who possessed the most critical 
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information within the agency, and had the duty of protecting the information that 
would be closely guarded and not shared. This situation has prevented line 
officers from sharing information in that the practice of sharing information up the 
chain of command could be misconstrued by supervisors as criticism of job 
performance. Therefore, in the prevailing survival of the fittest mentality, most 
line officers do not speak at meetings, and follow what is generally referred in the 
police subculture as taking the path of least resistance and risk. 
Technological Barriers 
Barriers to technological aspects of information sharing also must be 
addressed in conjunction with new administrative and organizational initiatives 
(Akbulut, 2003). Barriers to implementation include the determination of classified 
and declassified documents in a rapidly expanding federal bureaucracy. All 
documents must be assigned a security clearance prior to transfer to state and 
local law enforcement agencies (Roberts, 2006). Second, the skill level and 
support of information technology workers on both the federal and local levels 
are critical to the expansion of information sharing initiatives (Garfield, 2000). 
Also, the barriers involved with the complexity and logistics of implementation of 
a comprehensive system must be addressed before information can occur 
across all levels of law enforcement (Damanpour, 1991). 
Roberts (2006) stated the new applications for technology in government 
agencies has contributed to the dramatic increase in the volume of government 
documents. Classified and de-classified documents must be organized efficiently 
for information to flow from the federal to the local levels. The coordination of 
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information is complicated by the diversity of terrorist related documents. 
Department archivists responsible for the organization and transmission of such 
documents are overwhelmed by the quantity of government documents available 
for interagency transmission. Patterson and Sprehe (2002) reported even though 
government leaders sought to reduce the amount of paperwork through 
paperless office applications, such as databases, spreadsheets, and email, the 
amount of data has increased to millions of unsorted, unclassified intelligence 
documents over the past decade. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006) stated The Homeland 
Security Department was created, in part, to implement the ambitious goal of 
sharing information fluidly between the federal, state, and local levels of 
government. Terrorism information is rendered useless if not shared in a timely 
and efficient manner. An interoperable communications system must be 
implemented to rapidly and accurately inform all relevant parties in the case of a 
terrorist attack. A comprehensive incident command and operations plan—
detailing responsibilities and chains of command—also must be in place for 
emergency use. Such a plan allows officials to determine the most appropriate 
means of achieving interoperable communications (GAO, 2006). The proposed 
communication system must be inherently functional, allowing for the efficient 
access to information.  
Technological advancements need to be introduced concurrently to any 
organizational changes so intelligence information may flow freely through all 
levels of law enforcement. To this end, the 9/11 Commission urged federal 
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agencies to develop a decentralized network, which included state and local law 
enforcement agencies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
recommended (and was subsequently endorsed by the 9/11 Commission) 
information sharing processes and techniques as one of the four pillars leading to 
improved national security. The 9/11 Commission (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks, 2004) recommended 
a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland 
security information . . . . Information will be shared horizontally across 
each level of government and vertically among federal, state, and local 
governments’ private industry and citizens. With the proper use of people, 
organizational processes, and technology, homeland security officials 
throughout the United States can possess complete and common 
awareness of threats and vulnerabilities as well as the knowledge of the 
personnel and resources available to address these threats. (para. 141)  
Information Technology and Worker Attitudes 
The collective talents displayed by government workers historically had 
been a predictor of information sharing success. Tornatzky and Fleisher (1990) 
as well as Perry and Danzinger (1999) observed the successful introduction of 
new technologies is determined by the skill level of its operators. Organizations 
that employ well-trained, experienced personnel tend to incur smaller training 
and equipment costs in the integration of new technology. When police officers’ 
concerns of new initiatives are addressed directly, they are more likely to 
participate in new initiatives (Swanton, 1981; Tait & Vessey, 1988). Initially, 
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workers need to be convinced of the utility of new information systems. However, 
continued exposure and reinforcement to new technology resulted in increased 
user satisfaction and cultivated an environment conducive to further participation 
in innovative projects.  
Marchand (2004) stated positive worker attitudes have facilitated the 
implementation of new information-sharing programs, particularly at the federal 
level in regard to information technology. Marchand stated management must 
stress the quality of interaction between users and information processing in the 
organization. To the extent information systems are a means for achieving 
organizational ends, information systems also must be responsive to the tasks of 
government workers.  
The presence of network representatives in both leadership and support-
roles is important to success. Garfield (2000) and Norris (1989) demonstrated the 
presence of a network representative is critical to the success and acceptance of 
computer-linked systems. Garfield stated both user and technical experts must 
be present within each organization. User experts guide the use and promotion 
of the system, and technical experts make certain the systems operate 
effectively.  
Garfield (2000) introduced the term agency championship, referring to the 
function of an internal sponsor of a technology initiative. Research suggested 
individual sponsorship is important in the implementation of interagency 
information sharing systems. Garfield demonstrated how a system-wide 
champion is essential to attract interest and coordinate the implementation of an 
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information sharing program. The existence of project champions was found to 
be a significant element in the successful implementation of 83% of the 
information systems studied by Runge (1985). However, the existence of a single 
system-wide project champion is not always sufficient (Volkoff, Chan, & Newson, 
1999). Garfield demonstrated the presence of a network of site champions was 
important for the implementation success of networked computer systems. 
The benefit of employing workers with prior experience and expertise 
concerning technological initiatives is a significant factor that affects a public 
agency's ability to establish new organizational and technological systems. 
Organizations that have past innovation experience tend to be more inventive in 
other areas (Damanpour, 1991). Norris (1989) and Newcomer and Caudle (1991) 
found that previous agency information technology experience is a significant 
factor both in the adoption of new systems and the development of a positive 
organizational climate. 
Information technology literature has repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of meticulous management to coordinate information sharing and 
homeland defense (Posner, 2003). For example, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office [GAO] (GAO, 2003) cautioned the “introduction of newer, 
faster, cheaper technology is not a panacea for flawed management practices or 
poorly designed business processes” (p. 3). The Accounting and Information 
Management Division of the United States Government and Defense Information 
Systems observed the underlying problem with government information sharing 
is poor management (GAO, 2003).  
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Research by Public Technology (2000) reported effective information 
security is not related exclusively to technology, but instead requires strategic 
acumen on the part of management. Research by Berman and West (2002) 
concluded information technology workers need to combine technical expertise 
with management savvy to successfully work with other agencies in order to 
achieve strategic objectives. Moreover, the Institute for Information Infrastructure 
Protection (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002) determined a well-
designed information security system “requires expertise in information 
management and security technologies, as well as an understanding of policy 
requirements, business models, and organizational processes” (p. 2). 
The use of information technology speeds information flow and facilitates 
positive management values within an organization. However, the extent which 
information technology reinforces organizational values often depends on its 
implementation into the organization. Owen (1989) stated, “the creation of 
management values is useful for the reduction of administrative delay through 
information technology is to a larger extent a human and organizational problem 
and to a lesser extent a technological problem” (p. 2). In addition, middle and 
upper-managers should be accountable for their respective agencies regarding 
information security practices. Information technology managers must possess a 
unique understanding of information-related risk in order to make prudent 
decisions. 
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Organizational Complexity 
 Organizational complexity seeks to capture the overall scope of an 
agency’s operations, specifically in the areas of specialization, functional 
differentiation, and attitudes of the implementing workforce (Damanpour, 1991). 
Complexity is an important consideration in any proposed information sharing 
initiative, because complexity is one of the most prevalent barriers to the 
implementation of information sharing. Rogers (1995) defined complexity as the 
degree to which an initiative is difficult to understand and implement. Social 
scientists searched for accurate units of measurement that will be able to analyze 
the degree of complexity involved, because the degree of complexity correlates 
positively to the rate of successful adoption of initiatives. 
Social scientists often analyze proposed information sharing initiatives 
from the perspective of a complexity-simplicity continuum. This continuum allows 
each initiative to be analyzed using a common system of measurement. 
According to Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973), information sharing initiatives 
inherently involve a series of complex ideas. The intrinsic nature of electronic 
information sharing also involves a higher level of complexity in terms of logistics 
and the ability to implement an initiative, such as information sharing, across the 
entire organizational structure contained in both federal and local law 
enforcement. 
Complexity as it relates to the topic of information sharing also can be 
analyzed from an individual perspective. Rogers (1995) stated the complexity of 
an initiative or innovation, as it is perceived by members of an organization, is 
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negatively related to its rate of adoption. When a communication network is 
complex to the point of non-comprehension, a natural human tendency exists to 
reject the initiative and withdraw from participation. 
 The proposed communication system must be usable, thereby enabling 
efficient, easy access to information. Taylor (1986) pointed out that usability of a 
system is related to the interface between the system and its human user. 
Factors such as design, standardization, and coordination between information 
systems, as well as the location of computing resources, are significant factors 
that determine the efficiency and usability of information systems. It follows that 
user-friendly systems are accessed more frequently and with greater success.  
 Watson, Houdeshel, and Rainer (1997) explained why traditional 
information systems have had a limited impact on the upper management: 
despite claims of usability, they are too complex to be used by a majority of 
government agencies. User-friendliness rather than purely technical optimization 
ultimately is a critical element of an information technology system. 
 One method for organizational planners to assess complexity is to analyze 
the complexity of networks operating within the confines of the overall network 
structure. This process can be accomplished by analyzing the extent to which a 
network is considered to be structured or unstructured. Communication structure 
helps analyze the speed and stability of a network, which are both important 
indicators of the complexity of the network. From an organizational standpoint, 
network innovations, which contain relatively simplistic ideas typically, are given 
more consideration by planners than complicated ideas. 
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 Choi (1993) stated network structures can be measured to the extent that 
human decisions needed to run the systems are repetitive. Because the tasks 
involved in computer network systems are repetitive, the organization has 
previously developed a specific organizational process for handling problems. 
Conversely, when a request involves an unstructured action, it involves a 
decision that has not been previously handled, and thus likely to consume more 
time and resources to remedy the situation. Unstructured information results in 
an inefficient response, and is referred to by computer network experts as 
administrative delay. 
Choi (1993) stated the scale of novelty of an organization also has a direct 
correlation to complexity. Typically, government organizations that share 
intelligence information as one of its missions fall on the large-scale end of the 
continuum. When the scale of novelty is large, an increased level of commitment, 
resources, and manpower is required. It also allows for larger systems than 
would be created in the private sector, with a greater percentage of unstructured 
network systems. As Kaufman (1977) pointed out, characteristics that would be 
considered unacceptable and dangerous to organizations in the private sector 
often are tolerated in the public sector, due to government agencies’ unwavering 
commitment to equity, transparency, and oversight. Inefficient practices such as 
duplication and multiplicity in complex processes involved in the public sector 
often are justified in government organizations that lack a competitive economic 
environment. 
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 The management of information systems and, specifically, the 
management of data streams are a critical component of information sharing. 
Intelligence data shared between agencies often arrives in an unstructured 
fashion. Unstructured data is by definition non-compatible with the current 
agency structure, and thus takes additional resources and manpower to conduct 
information searches. Roberts (2006) referred to unstructured data as “the 
beating heart of any government agency, the center of everything the agency 
seeks to accomplish” (p. 212). 
Structured data provides a framework of which intelligence information 
can be processed programmatically. Downs (1967) warned that computer 
systems typically respond only to standard protocol previously programmed 
according to old standards. Lost and misreported information is inevitable under 
this type of system. Myers (1967) and Reif (1968) warned structured data codes 
contain a predetermined amount and type of information, and must be managed 
properly even if the information is converted from structured codes.     
Many of the factors of compatibility and complexity contain a combination 
of network and organizational attributes. For example, a network innovation 
compatible with one organization might be completely incompatible with another. 
Similarly, supervisors in a governmental organization may favor one innovation 
over another and aspire to increase budgetary resources for their favored 
initiative at the expense of other initiatives. Therefore, compatibility is best 
viewed as a combination of information technology networks and organizations 
merging to establish new processes. Wise (2002) emphasized, “the search for 
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compatibility in implementation of an idea is impossible in the absence of 
agreement on priorities and goals” (p. 5). Therefore, the coordination of goals 
both between and among agencies is essential in order to achieve 
interoperability across all levels of law enforcement. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
This study is designed to address the following research question: What 
factors influence intelligence information sharing between local and other law 
enforcement agencies? The following hypotheses were tested: 
H1:  There is a significant linear relationship between the gender of a 
police officer and support for information sharing. 
H2:  There is a significant relationship between race and police officer 
support of information sharing. 
H3:   There is a significant linear relationship between the educational 
level of police officers and support for information sharing. 
H4:   There is a significant linear relationship between the experience of 
police officers and support for information sharing. 
H5:  There is a significant linear relationship between prior military 
service of police officers and support for information sharing. 
H6:  There is a significant linear relationship between the type of training 
police officers receive and support for information sharing. 
H7:   There is a significant relationship between the size of a police 
department and support for information sharing. 
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H8:   There is a significant linear relationship between support for 
community policing and support for information sharing. 
H9:   There is a significant linear relationship between the complexity of 
communication tasks and support for information sharing.  
H10:  There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of 
external influence and support for information sharing.  
H11:  There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of 
internal influence and support for information sharing. 
H12:   There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of 
trust between federal and local police agencies and support for 
information sharing. 
Summary 
Chapter II presented a review of the literature related to the research 
questions of the study. The intent of the presented information was to ground the 
study upon current research on the topics and to lend support for an investigation 
into what correlations exists among the variables of the study. To fully explain the 
complexity of accurately and efficiently sharing intelligence information between 
all levels of law enforcement, the literature review included a detailed description 
of the police organizational movement from reactive to proactive police 
strategies. Other topics reviewed included organizational bureaucracy, 
community policing, and a description of information sharing strategies post 9/11 
between federal and local agencies. Chapter III provides a detailed description of 
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the methodology to be employed to gather and analyze data in sufficient detail to 
suggest recommendations to answer the research questions.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter III presented the research methodology. This chapter described in 
detail the methods which were employed in the study. The methodology section 
included the sample, instrument development and testing, data collection, and 
analysis.  
Research Method and Design Appropriateness 
The research design of this study was an elaboration logically derived 
from the Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study sections from 
Chapter I (Simon & Francis, 2006). A need to describe and measure the degree 
of relationship between two or more variables resulted in the selection of a 
quantitative design (Creswell, 2005). A quantitative research method, specifically, 
correlation analysis, provided the group of statistical measures considered 
necessary to portray the relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). 
Quantitative Research 
The goal of quantitative research is to collect numerical data and construct 
statistical models in an attempt to explain observations (Creswell, 2005). 
Researchers use questionnaires, in part, to collect data, which is efficient in 
testing hypotheses (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Quantitative research is objective, 
and the research field describes it as countable. Quantitative research involves 
asking specific, narrow questions to obtain measurable variables (Creswell, 
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2005). The use of a survey instrument to collect data from preset questions lends 
itself well to a quantitative method of measuring the variables (Neuman, 2006).  
Quantitative research differs from qualitative, as quantitative seeks to 
systematically, factually, and accurately describe the facts and characteristics of 
a given population or area of interest (Neuman, 2006). Quantitative research 
uses detailed questions to obtain measurable and observable numerical data on 
variables (Creswell, 2005). Qualitative data collection is subjective because the 
data collected is in words, pictures, or objects (Neuman, 2006).  
The selection of a quantitative design is appropriate when variables of the 
study are clear (Creswell, 2005). When variables are unknown, a qualitative 
design may help identify what is important, determining, in part, what needs to be 
studied (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Qualitative research studies typically help 
describe, interpret, and validate certain assumptions or generalizations (Neuman, 
2006). Because the variables for this study are clear, a quantitative design 
examined the relationship between the variables in order to address the research 
questions. 
Quantitative research uses a language of variables and relationships 
among variables to investigate research questions. A variable, as opposed to a 
constant, can fluctuate or be expressed as more than one value (Simon & 
Francis, 2006). Quantitative designs have at least two types of variables: 
independent and dependent (Creswell, 2005).  
Understanding variables is essential in analyzing the data collected. 
Distinguishing between dependent variables and independent variables is 
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imperative (Creswell, 2005). An independent variable stands alone and is not 
changed by the other variables measured. Dependent variables are contingent 
on other factors.  
Quantitative descriptive research methodologies include correlations, 
observations, and surveys. Additional quantitative approaches include 
experimental and causal-comparative methodologies (Neuman, 2006). Each of 
these approaches yielded information which was summarized by statistical 
analysis.  
Participants 
Participants were selected from a total of 2,100 law enforcement 
personnel from police ranks in four geographical areas of the United States. The 
appropriate number of participants was determined by pairing the combined 
population size of the four police departments surveyed with the desired 95% 
confidence level selected by this researcher. Dillman (2007) determined the 
appropriate number of participants is a minimum of 322 survey respondents. (p. 
207). The cities were selected as a convenient sample by this researcher and 
were divided into regions of the United States, with each region represented by 
one police department in four separate states. Two small police departments 
(less than 50 officers) as well as two large police departments (more than 200 
officers) were selected so large and small department comparisons could be 
made. Federal law enforcement personnel were exempt from this study because 
the purpose of this study was to examine the level of support and participation of 
local personnel in information sharing initiatives from the local to the federal level. 
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The street- or line-level police officer is the type of officer most likely to encounter 
a domestic terrorist. Street-level officers also have the opportunity to take part in 
the administrative process by directly typing into their laptops the terrorism 
information to be shared with state and local law enforcement, thus patrol or line 
officers were preferred in this study. 
In addition, police departments located in cities on or near a geographical 
border were preferred. Sarewitz, Pielke, and Keykhah (2003) stated even with 
the application of advanced statistical modeling, it is impossible to predict where 
a future catastrophic event will occur. However, extreme events often are 
predicated by context. The fact the 9/11 attack occurred in the largest United 
States metropolitan area demonstrated the potential vulnerability of large 
metropolitan coastal cities. Also, police departments were preferred that had 
experience with other types of first responder crises, such as hurricanes, 
tornados, or floods. Finally, police departments with prior information sharing 
experiences with federal and state agencies were desired in other areas of law 
enforcement such as drugs, fugitives, guns, and gangs. The following is a 
breakdown of respondent demographics. 
Table 1 
Respondent Demographics—Region  
 
Region   Total Percent 
North 
 
246 60.3 
West 
 
132 32.4 
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Table 1 (continued). 
 
Region   Total Percent 
South 
 
24 5.9 
East 
 
6 1.5 
Total   408 100 
 
Table 2 
Respondent Demographics—Gender 
 
Gender   Male Female 
North 
 
230 16 
West 
 
114 18 
South 
 
23 1 
East 
 
6 0 
Total   373 35 
 
Table 3 
Respondent Demographics—Ethnicity 
 
Ethnicity   White Black Hispanic Other 
North 
 
205 37 0 4 
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Table 3 (continued). 
 
Ethnicity   White Black Hispanic Other 
West 
 
124 4 0 4 
South 
 
23 1 0 0 
East 
 
6 0 0 0 
Total   358 42 0 8 
 
Table 4 
Respondent Demographics—Age 
 
Age   20–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61+ 
North 
 
82 72 48 34 10 
West 
 
2 10 11 2 0 
South 
 
3 9 9 1 2 
East 
 
0 3 1 1 1 
Total   115 132 106 41 13 
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Table 5 
Respondent Demographics—Education 
 
Education High school Bachelors Masters Doctorate Other 
North 55 142 15 1 0 
West 12 93 4 0 22 
South 12 6 0 0 6 
East 1 3 1 0 1 
Total 80 244 20 1 62 
 
Table 6 
Respondent Demographics—Experience 
 
Experience 0–5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21–25 26+ 
North 83 42 43 30 21 27 
West 22 32 43 27 6 1 
South 4 6 5 5 2 2 
East 0 1 1 1 1 2 
Total 109 81 92 63 30 32 
 
Note. Experience is listed in years 
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Table 7 
Respondent Demographics—Military 
 
Military   Yes No 
North 
 
60 186 
West 
 
37 192 
South 
 
8 16 
East 
 
1 5 
Total   106 302 
 
Table 8 
Respondent Demographics—Training 
 
Training   Trad Com Pol 
North 
 
246 0 
West 
 
0 132 
South 
 
24 0 
East 
 
6 0 
Total   276 132 
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Table 9 
Respondent Demographics—Rank 
 
Rank   Patrol  Corp Sarg Other 
North 
 
156 7 32 51 
West 
 
101 0 13 18 
South 
 
10 3 2 9 
East 
 
5 0 0 1 
Total   269 11 49 79 
 
 
Table 10 
Respondent Demographics—Department Size 
 
Department size   Large Small 
North-L 
 
246 0 
West-L 
 
132 0 
South-S 
 
0 24 
East-S 
 
0 6 
Total   378 30 
 
 
Of those participants who completed the items which requested 
demographic information, 246 (60%) were identified from the North Region. The 
84 
 
West Region contained 132 (32%) percent of respondents surveyed. The South 
Region reported 24 (6%) of the total number of respondents surveyed. The East 
Region reported 13 (2%) of the total number of respondents surveyed.  
Of those participants who completed the items which requested gender 
information, 373 (91%) were identified as male police officers, while 35 (9%) 
were identified as female police officers. Further, 358 (88%) respondents were 
identified as White or Caucasian. In addition, 42 (10%) respondents identified 
themselves as Black, and eight (2%) respondents identified themselves as other. 
Of those participants who completed the items which requested education 
information, 80 (20%) respondents had earned a high school diploma, 244 (61%) 
respondents earned a college diploma, 20 (5%) respondents held a master’s 
degree, and one (0.03%) respondent held a Ph.D. In addition, 62 (15%) 
respondents indicated their degree as other. The other as a category was 
identified by this researcher as police officers who have obtained an associate’s 
degree. 
Of those participants who completed the items which requested 
information on age, 115 (28%) respondents were between the ages of 20–30. 
Further, 132 (32%) respondents were between the ages of 31–40. In addition, 
104 (26%) respondents were between the ages of 41–50. Further, 41 (10%) 
respondents indicated they were between the ages of 51–60. Finally, 13 (0.03%) 
respondents were over the age of 61. 
Of those participants who completed the items that requested information 
concerning police work experience, 109 (27%) respondents indicated they had 
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0–5 years on the job experience, and 81 (20%) respondents indicated they had 
between 5–10 years of police work experience. Further, 92 (27%) participants 
indicated they had between 10–15 years of on the job experience. In addition, 63 
(27%) participants indicated they had between 16–20 years of on the job 
experience. Further, 30 (7%) participants indicated they had between 21–25 
years of on the job experience. Finally, 32 (8%) participants indicated they had 
over 26 years of experience as a police officer. 
Of those participants who completed the items that requested information 
concerning their rank as a police officer, 269 (66%) respondents indicated they 
currently hold the rank of a patrol officer. In addition, 11 (2%) respondents 
indicated they currently hold the rank of corporal. Further, 49 (12%) participants 
indicated they currently hold the rank of Sergeant. Finally, 79 (19%) participants 
listed their rank as other. Other includes all other ranks not specifically 
referenced in the study, including ranks up to chief of police. 
Of those participants who completed the items which requested 
information concerning whether they were a member of the military, 106 (26%) 
respondents stated that they served in the military, while, 302 (74%) respondents 
stated they have never served in the military 
Of those participants who completed the items that requested information 
concerning whether respondents were trained using the traditional or community 
philosophy, 276 (68%) stated they were trained using traditional methods, while 
132 (32%) respondents stated that they have been trained in some aspect of 
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community policing. Finally, 343 (91%) respondents were from large police 
departments, while 31 (9%) stated they were members of small departments. 
Instrumentation 
Quantitative data collection and data analysis required careful 
consideration of the survey instrument design. The primary goal was to ensure 
the survey, and the data collected with the survey, provide the intended 
measurement (Creswell, 2005). Meaningful conclusions were achieved through 
the survey and data collection process. An anonymous three-part survey which 
consisted of a series of questions pertaining to respondent demographics, 
information sharing survey, and an open-ended question comprise the survey 
instrument. 
The demographic instrument collected the data necessary to provide a 
number of descriptive statistics pertaining to the respondents’ project 
management experience, the scope and complexity of the project, and the 
project collaboration tools used to complete the project. Researchers use 
descriptive statistics to describe raw data. Descriptive statistics include measures 
of central tendency, such as the mean, median, and mode (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005). 
The survey instrument provided a measurement of line officers’ support of 
information sharing initiatives as well as views of police service delivery. One 
open-ended question was also included, and some survey respondents provided 
written opinions of barriers to information sharing implementation, which may or 
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may not have been different from barriers presented within the context of the 
survey instrument. 
The survey was validated through consultation with experts in the fields of 
survey research, business administration, and law enforcement. Dr. Robert 
Adkins, Dean Emeritus, Liberty University; and Dr. Pedro Pellet, Professor of 
Business Administration, Nova Southeastern University, reviewed the survey to 
ensure the survey structure was constructed properly, with appropriate and 
understandable language to facilitate accurate responses. 
 In addition, law enforcement personnel were consulted by this researcher 
to ensure the questions reflect the current and future factors related to federal 
and local law enforcement information sharing partnerships. An effort was made 
by this researcher to structure the questions for the respondents in a manner that 
would facilitate maximum understanding and participation. The solicited law 
enforcement personnel included Dr. William Campbell, United States Customs 
Officer, Retired; Mr. Terry Milam, Chief, St. John Police Department, St. Louis 
County, Missouri; and Mr. John Burke, St. Louis City Police Officer, Retired. 
After consultation with the panel, the following adjustments were made to 
the survey instrument. First, the panel recommended the survey be shortened to 
minimize the time needed to complete the survey. The panel also cited the large 
amount of paperwork as not to distract the officers as they perform their duties. 
As a result of this request, the survey was shortened so that it would take no 
longer than 10–15 minutes to complete.  
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Second, the panel stated some of the questions in the survey 
questionnaire may be difficult for police officers to understand. Therefore, a 
readability test was utilized by this researcher. Readability metrics were intended 
to identify the difficulty police officers might experience in understanding a 
question in a survey. Pretlow (2008) stated readability tests were first developed 
in the United States in the 1920s based on mathematical formulas designed to 
determine the suitability of course-specific textbooks for American students. 
Flesch (1948) originally calibrated the formulas based on the students’ 
appropriate grade levels as well as age. The equation provided a readability 
score based on the number of words per sentence as well as the number of 
syllables per word. 
Table 11 
Information Sharing Survey Meta-Analysis 
Question 
# 
 
Survey question 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
grade level 
 
 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
read 
score 
 
Words per 
sentence 
 
Characters 
per word 
 
General Questions / Community Policing 
1) Information obtained from 
citizens is critical to good 
police work. 
10.7 35.9 10 5.7 
2) Cooperation with other 
agencies is critical to good 
police work. 
10.7 35.9 10 6.1 
3) I sometimes need access to 
information during the 
course of an investigation 
that I know other law 
enforcement agencies 
possess. 
12 24.7 20 5.4 
4) I believe that preventing 
crime is just as important as 
solving crimes. 
6.7 67.7 12 4.9 
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Table 11 (continued). 
Question 
# 
 
Survey question 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
grade level 
 
 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
read 
score 
 
Words per 
sentence 
 
Characters 
per word 
 
5) I believe solving problems in 
the community is an 
important part of police work. 
9.1 56.2 15 4.6 
Support 
1) The attack of 9/11 has 
increased the need for better 
communication between all 
levels of law enforcement. 
11.5 42.8 18 4.7 
2) If I were appointed the chief 
administrator of my agency, I 
would make information 
sharing a priority. 
12 30.3 17 5.1 
3) If I were appointed the chief 
administrator of my agency, I 
would be willing to allocate 
agency resources for 
information sharing. 
12 28.4 21 5.1 
4) I believe the overall benefits 
of sharing information with 
other agencies outweighs 
the negatives. 
12 77.3 14 5.9 
5) If I were appointed the chief 
administrator of my agency, I 
would support information 
training with other law 
enforcement agencies. 
12 21.5 20 5.5 
External Influence 
1) Federal agencies have had 
an influence on our 
department's decision to 
share information with other 
agencies. 
12 26.6 16 5.8 
2) Federal agencies have 
suggested that our agency 
share intelligence 
information electronically. 
12 27.7 11 5.8 
3) Our agency has previously 
accepted an invitation from a 
federal agency to participate 
in a joint training task force 
involving counterterrorism. 
12 42.9 21 5.8 
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Table 11 (continued). 
Question 
# 
 
Survey question 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
grade level 
 
 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
read 
score 
 
Words per 
sentence 
 
Characters 
per word 
 
4) Our agency has been 
criticized by other law 
enforcement agencies for 
our handling of information 
during a joint investigation. 
12 24.4 13 5.7 
5) Federal agencies keep our 
agency informed about the 
downside of not sharing 
information. 
10.7 35.9 10 6.1 
Complexity 
1) It is difficult to learn 
computer skills necessary 
for sharing information with 
other law enforcement 
agencies. 
12 16.1 16 5.9 
2) Electronic information 
sharing is a difficult concept 
to understand. 
12 37.3 9 6.5 
3) I am willing to spend a large 
amount of time to learn a 
computer system format 
which has the potential to 
provide useful information. 
12 51.1 24 4.6 
4) I have received periodic 
training associated with 
information sharing from 
other agencies. 
12 48.5 12 4.5 
5) It is more difficult to share 
information with other law 
enforcement agencies which 
do not have the same 
standard operating 
procedures as our agency. 
12 27.3 24 5.4 
Trust 
1) Federal agencies and our 
agency have a high level of 
mutual trust. 
10.2 37.9 12 5.3 
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Table 11 (continued). 
Question 
# 
 
Survey question 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
grade level 
 
 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
read score 
 
Words per 
sentence 
 
Characte
rs per 
word 
 
2) Federal agencies keep our 
departments' best interest in 
mind. 
12 37.9 9 5.7 
3) If our agency shared 
intelligence information with 
a federal agency, I am 
confident that the information 
shared would not be 
compromised. 
12 21.5 20 5.7 
4) Pertinent information and 
investigative assistance by 
outside agencies are 
encouraged by my agency. 
12 30.2 13 5.3 
5) I would feel comfortable 
going outside my agency's 
chain of command if I 
believed I had information 
that was being ignored by my 
agency. 
12 30.2 13 5.3 
Internal Pressure 
1) I would be more likely to 
support information sharing if 
my supervisor though it was 
important. 
10.5 47.8 16 5 
2) I would be more likely to 
support information sharing if 
I were given greater flexibility 
by my supervisor to conduct 
and share information as the 
investigation dictates. 
12 21 27 5.5 
3) I believe that learning and 
applying information sharing 
techniques is important for 
my career advancement. 
12 28.2 15 6.1 
4) The time my supervisors 
make me spend on tasks 
associated with information 
sharing could be better spent 
in other areas of law 
enforcement. 
12 40 23 5.1 
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Table 11 (continued). 
Question 
# 
 
Survey question 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
grade level 
 
 
 
Flesh-
Kincade 
read 
score 
 
Words per 
sentence 
 
Characters 
per word 
 
5) My agency administrators 
make information sharing a 
priority in my department. 
12 42.2 11 6.1 
Totals 12 32.3 17.3 5.2 
 
Procedures 
The names and mailing addresses for department supervisors were 
obtained from the Chief of Police for all geographic areas. The survey was 
mailed to department supervisors, who were responsible for distributing the 
survey to individual participants.  
A two-stage mailing procedure was used that included overnight mailings 
through the U.S. Postal Service. Surveys were sent with a cover letter explaining 
the study, and a self-addressed, stamped overnight envelope was included. 
Although surveys were completed anonymously to protect the identity of 
individual participants, a tracking system was used so that non-responders could 
be identified. After four weeks, the same surveys, cover letter, and self-
addressed, stamped return envelope were sent to region representatives asking 
the potential respondents to complete the survey and return if they had not 
already done so. The second cover letter asked respondents to disregard the 
reminder letter if they already have completed and returned the survey within the 
first mailing period. Although the two-stage mailing process represents the 
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primary manner in which the study was conducted, other factors were present 
which need be added to the procedures described in the study. These factors 
included both the location and size of the police departments selected for the 
study. Both the location and size of the departments made it feasible in some 
instances for this researcher to follow-up in person in order to try and maximize 
the response rate. 
Chain of Custody of Survey Instrument 
The chain of custody in this study was from this researcher to previously 
selected police department representatives. The representatives were 
designated by the police chiefs to deliver the survey instrument to the 
respondents, typically at a patrol meeting or during work breaks. The surveys 
were returned upon completion to the representative who forwarded them to this 
researcher via overnight mail or, in some instances, by a face-to-face meeting 
with this researcher. 
Survey Responses and Sample Population 
 Descriptive characteristics of respondents were presented in Tables 1–10. 
Surveys were distributed to 500 potential respondents in each of the large police 
departments and 25 surveys for the small police departments. The overall survey 
response rate for the study was 39%. The survey response percentages broken 
down by region and size of department were as follows: for the north region, of 
the 500 surveys distributed, 246 surveys were returned, for a percentage of 49%; 
for the west region, of the 500 surveys distributed, 132 were returned, for a  
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percentage of 26%. The overall percentage of surveys returned for large police 
departments was 36%. 
The survey response percentage for small police departments were as 
follows: the South region had 24 surveys distributed, and 24 surveys were 
returned, for a percentage of 100%; the East Region had 13 surveys distributed, 
and 6 surveys were returned, for a percentage of 46%; and the overall 
percentage of surveys returned from small police departments was 94%. 
 Social scientists historically have disagreed on acceptable rates of return. 
For example, Fitzgerald and Cox (1987) stated a 50% survey return rate is 
considered average, but needed for valid results. Babbie (1989) suggested a 
70% survey return rate can be achieved through application of enhanced survey 
techniques, but might not necessarily be needed depending on the accessibility 
to the target population. Babbie added future trends in research indicate a shift 
towards a lower acceptability of survey returns. 
Colwell, Miller, Lyons, and Miller (2006) added response rates vary due to 
disparities in resources, time, and effort of the researcher, as well as differences 
in subject matter and the target population to be studied. Winfree, Guiterman, 
and Mays (1997) stated that, historically, police officer based studies have 
yielded relatively low response rates ranging from 30–50%. McKee (personal 
communication, December 20, 2008) speculated that increased paperwork and 
case load of police officers due to budget constraints have contributed to the 
comparatively low rate of survey return. McKee added as the field of criminal  
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justice increases in scope, competition for research access to key police 
departments also will increase. 
Informed Consent 
An informed consent form for each study participant was included with 
each questionnaire distributed. The informed consent form advised perspective 
participants that participation in the study was voluntary, and return of the 
questionnaire was considered for purposes of the study as consent to participate. 
Respondents were notified that all responses remained confidential throughout 
the entire research process, including the reporting of results. There was no risk 
to respondents that participated in the study, and no questions were asked which 
were related to specific or ongoing police investigations. 
Confidentiality 
Questionnaires were mailed directly to the designated department 
representatives whose police departments agreed to take part in the study. The 
questionnaires contained no specific respondent identification data of any type. 
Respondent representatives returned the anonymous questionnaire in an 
overnight package, which was used strictly for coding and analysis purposes by 
this researcher.  
Data Analysis 
Survey data was entered into a computer using the SPSS for Windows 
statistical package 18.0. Descriptive statistics (frequencies, range of scores, 
means, and standard deviations) were utilized to describe the respondents in 
terms of their demographic and background characteristics. T-tests were used to 
96 
 
analyze the differences in responses between groups based on demographic 
variables (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, geographic location, level of education). 
Multiple regression analysis was used on the question portion of the survey 
instrument in order to determine which independent variables might be used to 
predict support for intelligence information sharing initiatives (e.g., trust, internal 
influence, external influence, complexity, and community policing). 
Summary 
Chapter III provided a detailed description of the methodology to be 
employed to gather and analyze data in sufficient detail to suggest 
recommendations to answer the research questions (Neuman, 2006). Chapter III 
also provided a rationale for the appropriateness of a quantitative approach using 
a multiple regression analysis (Creswell, 2005; Leedy & Ormand, 2005). A 
description of the target population, geographic location, and sampling frame 
provided some insight into the demographics of study participants. A review of 
the data collection and analysis process included details of survey instruments, 
obtaining informed consent, maintaining confidentiality, and ensuring validity and 
reliability in the study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Instrument Evaluation 
The structure of the Information Sharing Survey was examined using 
exploratory factor analytic techniques. It was predicted that five major factors 
would emerge: Trust, Internal Influence, Community Policing, External Influence, 
and Complexity. Questions that were loaded heavily on more than one factor as 
well as questions that failed to load heavily on any factor were considered invalid 
and eliminated from further analysis. The resulting scale was determined to be 
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .664). Table 1 presents the rotated component 
matrix of the questions that were retained and thus used in the subsequent 
regression analyses. 
Table 12 
Equamax Rotated Component Matrix, N = 408 
 
Item Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV Factor V 
Trust #1 .660     
Trust #2 .785     
Trust #3 .781     
Trust #4 .679     
Internal Influence #1  .735    
Internal Influence #2  .659    
Internal Influence #4  .414    
Internal Influence #5  .670    
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Table 12 (continued). 
 
Item Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV Factor V 
Community Policing #1   .610   
Community Policing #2   .464   
Community Policing #4   .648   
Community Policing #5   .711   
External Influence #1    .331  
External Influence #3    .696  
External Influence #5    .694  
Complexity #3     .691 
Complexity #4     .687 
Complexity #5     .383 
 
Note. Loadings less than .35 are not displayed to facilitate factor identification. 
 
As illustrated in Table 12, Question 5 on the trust subscale was 
eliminated, as was Question 3 from the Internal Influence subscale, Question 3 
from the community policing subscale, Questions 2 and 4 from the external 
influence subscale, and Questions 1 and 2 from the complexity subscale.  
Table 13 presents zero-order correlation coefficients for select 
demographic variables and support for information sharing. The variables, 
gender, education level, military service, and training type, were not significantly 
correlated with support for information sharing. Years of experience was, 
however, significantly correlated to support for information sharing. This suggests 
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that, on average, younger, less experienced officers are less likely to support 
information sharing than are older, more experienced officers.  
Table 13 
 
Zero-Order Intercorrelation Matrix for Demographic Variables and Support for 
Information Sharing (N = 408) 
 
Variable 
 
Gender 
 
Education 
 
Experience 
 
Military 
 
Training 
 
Support 
Gender — -.021 -.159** .022 .067 -.079 
Education  — .107* -.089 .071 -.010 
Experience 
(years) 
  — -.046 -.028 .215** 
Military    — -.032 -.022 
Training     — .067 
Support      — 
 
Note. Coding: Sex (0 = Female, 1 = Male); Education (0 = High School, 1 = B.A. / B.S., 2 = Master’s, 3 = Doctorate); 
Experience (0 = 0 to 5, 1 = 6 to 10, 2 = 11 to 15, 3 = 16 to 20, 4 = 21 to 25, 5 = 26+); Military Service (0 = Yes, 1 = No); 
Training (0 = Traditional, 1 = Community Policing). 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Table 14 presents the zero-order correlation coefficients between the five 
subscales of the Information Sharing Survey and the Support Scale. 
Table 14 
Zero-Order Intercorrelation Matrix for All Subscale Items and the Support for 
Information Sharing Subscale (N = 408) 
 
Variable 
 
Trust 
 
 
Internal 
influence 
 
 
 
Community 
policing 
 
External 
influence 
 
Complexity 
 
Support 
 
Trust — .078 .078 .237** .018 .084 
Internal influence  — .163** .108* -.018 .144** 
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Table 14 (continued). 
 
Variable 
 
Trust 
 
 
Internal 
influence 
 
 
 
Community 
policing 
 
External 
influence 
 
Complexity 
 
Support 
 
Community policing   — .114* -.102* .389** 
External influence    — .090 .187** 
Complexity     — .065 
Support      — 
 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
   
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation was derived in two 
steps using the support subscale as the dependent variables and gender, 
education level, years of experience, military service, and training type as the 
independent variables in the first step. This multimodel method allows for the 
statistical control of these demographic variables when evaluating the subscale 
scores. The trust, internal influence, community policing, external influence, and 
complexity subscales were entered in the second step. Initial collinearity 
diagnostics suggested that rank, age, and years of experience were collinear. 
The most cogent factor was the participants’ overall years of experience. Thus, 
the final analysis includes years of experience, but does not include rank or age. 
Based on the strength of the correlations provided in Table 12 and Table 13 and 
examination of collinearity statistics, it was determined that no other serious 
collinearity issues existed within the data. The regression results are presented in 
Table 15.  
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Table 15 
OLS Regression Solutions Predicting Support for Information Sharing (N = 408) 
 
  
Model I 
  
Model II 
Variable b S.E. β  b S.E. β 
Constant 20.235 .263 —  9.697 1.187 — 
Gender -.408 .356 -.057  -.383 .325 -.053 
Education level -.066 .080 -.040  -.092 .073 -.056 
Experience .276 .064 .212**  .227 .059 .174** 
Military service -.048 .224 -.011  -.088 .205 -.019 
Training type .363 .211 .084  .319 .197 .074 
Trust — — —  .005 .028 .008 
Internal 
influence 
— — —  .065 .038 .080 
Community 
policing 
— — —  .451 .058 .358** 
External 
influence 
— — —  .105 .043 .113* 
Complexity — — —  .093 .047 .088* 
R2  .057    .227  
Adjusted R2  .045    .207  
F  4.811    11.615  
 
ΔR
2
 = .170. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
 
The first model, which contained only the demographic characteristics of 
the participants, explained only 5.7% of the variance in support for information 
sharing. When controlling for these demographic characteristics, the Support for 
Information Sharing Scale accounted for an additional 17% of the variance, for a 
total of 22.7% of the variance explained.  
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 Among the demographic variables, the only significant indicator of support 
for information sharing was the level of experience of the responding officer. As 
previously discussed, this measure was heavily collinear with the age of the 
responding officer as well as the officer’s rank. For this reason, those particular 
variables were not included in the regression analysis. Of the five survey 
subscales, Trust and Internal Influence were not statistically significant. 
Community Policing, External Influence, and Complexity were all statistically 
significant. Thus, the best predictors of support for information sharing were the 
number of years of experience that an officer has, the officer’s level of support for 
community policing, the officer’s perception of external influences on 
departmental policy, and the complexity of how information is shared. 
Specifically, officers that supported the community policing philosophy were more 
likely to support information sharing. This was the single best predictor of support 
for information sharing (β = .358). Additionally, the more perceived influence that 
outside forces have on an officer’s department, the more likely the officer is to 
support information sharing.  
Discussion 
Hypotheses 
H1:  There is a significant linear relationship between the gender of a 
police officer and support for information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not support a 
relationship between gender and police officer support for information sharing. 
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H2:  There is a significant relationship between race and police officer 
support of information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest a 
relationship between race and support for information sharing. 
H3:  There is a significant linear relationship between the educational 
level of police officers and support for information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not support a 
relationship between the educational level of police officers and support for 
information sharing. 
H4:   There is a significant linear relationship between the experience of 
police officers and support for information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The data supports a relationship 
between the experience level of a police officer and support for information 
sharing. That is, older, more experienced police officers tend to support 
information sharing. 
H5:  There is a significant linear relationship between prior military 
service of police officers and support for information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not support a 
relationship between prior military service by a police officer and support for 
information sharing. 
H6:  There is a significant linear relationship between the type of training 
police officers receive and support for information sharing. 
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Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not show a 
relationship between the type of training and support for information sharing.  
H7:  There is a significant relationship between the size of a police 
department and support for information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest a 
relationship between the size of a police department and support for information 
sharing. 
H8:   There is a significant linear relationship between support for 
community policing and support for information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The regression analysis indicated 
that there is a linear relationship between support for community policing and 
information sharing. That is, police officers who tend to support community 
policing also tend to support information sharing. 
H9:   There is a significant linear relationship between the complexity of 
communication tasks and support for information sharing.  
Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The regression analysis indicated 
that there is a linear relationship between the perceived complexity of tasks and 
support for information sharing.  
H10:  There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of 
external influence and support for information sharing.  
Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The more external influence is 
perceived to play a role by police officers, the more officers tend to support 
information sharing. 
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H11:  There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of 
internal influence and support for information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest that 
there is a relationship between perceptions of internal influence and support of 
information sharing. 
H12:   There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of 
trust between federal and local police agencies and support for 
information sharing. 
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest that 
there is a relationship between perceptions of trust between federal and local law 
enforcement and support for information sharing. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
A review of the available literature suggests intelligence information 
sharing is a valuable tool for law enforcement to adequately protect the United 
States from a future domestic terrorist attack. A thorough examination on the 
topic of information sharing reveals successful communicative initiatives with 
intrinsic benefits for all department and agencies involved in the programs. 
Because homeland security was not considered a law enforcement priority 
before the 9/11 attacks, few studies existed on the topic of information sharing. 
The present study attempts to contribute to the literature by facilitating the 
discussion of a unified strategy to intelligence information sharing among all 
levels of law enforcement. The present study contributes to overcoming the 
substantial obstacles by revealing barriers to information sharing as well as 
identifying areas of support from local law enforcement.  
Several respondent characteristics located in the demographic portion of 
the survey stood out as beneficial to the potential enhancement of 
comprehensive intelligence information sharing initiatives. First, the education 
level of police officers, as indicated by respondents in the study, is clearly rising. 
In the present study, 62% of the respondents possessed a college degree or 
higher, compared to the 45% average across the United States (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 2010). Select precincts within large city respondents reported 100% of 
the police officers surveyed possessed bachelor’s degrees with an additional 5% 
also having graduated with a master’s degree. 
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Secondly, an examination of all four departments revealed that law 
enforcement is clearly an occupation that is becoming more professionalized with 
a comprehensive list of minimal standards, which must be met before 
employment. Education (including training) is undoubtedly one of the core 
requirements emphasized across the country. The education statistics presented 
clearly have positive implications for modern 21st century police tactics, including 
the development and enhancement of future information sharing 
initiatives. Without the proper education and training, officers will not be able to 
keep pace with the technological as well as tactical expertise needed to 
implement comprehensive information sharing initiatives. 
In the present study, a majority of the respondents believed operating a 
computer was a simple skill to master. This response was an indication that 
police officers are becoming more comfortable with the utilization of modern 
technology in their jobs. The fact all four of the respondent departments currently 
utilize laptop computers in their patrol cars represents the increasing familiarity of 
incorporating technology into modern police practices. The utilization of laptops 
by local patrolman is a critical first step in the process of sharing information, so 
the familiarity and comfort level, as well as the desire to learn new technologies 
as they become available, are critical to the advancement of information sharing 
moving forward. 
The demographic portion of the survey also revealed older officers are 
more likely to support information sharing than younger officers. This was not a 
surprise when viewed in context with the final qualitative question of the survey. 
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Although it would make sense that younger police officers would embrace the 
more technological aspects of the information sharing process, several older 
officers, as referenced by their qualitative responses, clearly saw themselves as 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno coined, citizen agents. That is, in the final years of 
their careers as police, helping people tended to give more experienced police 
officers more job satisfaction than arresting people.   
A north respondent with 27 years of experience wrote simply, “At this point 
in my career, I am on the job solely to help people and help solve community 
problems” (J. Webster, personal communication, February 10, 2010). The police 
chief of the south region stated,  
I know this is a generalization, but the younger guys prefer to kick down 
doors and crack heads and make cases that involve excitement and help 
advance their careers. The older guys tend to prefer the camaraderie 
associated with working together on a case for a common purpose. I know 
the older guys enjoy attending the training seminars more than the 
younger guys. It’s like a reunion for the older guys, they become 
reacquainted with officers from other departments from prior cases, they 
swap stories, and sometimes those prior working relationships lead to the 
making of future cases. (W. Payne, personal communication, November 
14, 2009) 
The community policing variable contained within the survey was the 
group of questions that had the greatest significance. While it cannot be 
scientifically concluded that support of community policing tenets will 
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automatically support information sharing initiatives, it does suggest that officers 
overwhelmingly support and are interested in the expansion and training of 
proactive police tactics, including technology, of which information sharing is a 
component.  
There was no statistical significance between officers who learned a 
community policing curriculum in basic training and officers who were taught a 
traditional curriculum in basic training as it relates to the support of information 
sharing. However, officers of both training methods overwhelmingly placed their 
support in the proactive police practices that comprise information sharing. This 
survey result would indicate, as Lipsky (1980) stated in Street-level Bureaucracy: 
Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, that all service delivery by a public 
servant is provided  intrinsically and is fundamentally both “immediate and 
personal”  to the individual public servant providing the service (p. 8). Therefore, 
the establishment of comprehensive information sharing is literally a battle of the 
hearts and minds of all local police officers. Line-officers are the public service 
workers who are entrusted both at the beginning of the communication network 
and for follow-up investigation. Line officer support is imperative for efficient 
service delivery in this area of law enforcement.  
The significance of the external pressure variable demonstrates both 
opportunities and barriers which confront local and federal agencies working 
together on joint task force cases or on the continued development of 
interoperable communication networks. Police administrative leadership on both 
sides will be needed if information sharing initiatives are to continue and expand. 
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The present study indicates both sides are influenced by each other and can 
benefit from each agency’s resources and expertise in strategic joint investigative 
areas.  
Local agencies clearly benefit from the budgetary resources that federal 
agencies possess. Local police departments working together with federal 
agencies can provide the resources and additional manpower that local 
departments often need to bring a complex case to a successful 
conclusion. Federal agencies need the informants and inherent knowledge of the 
area that local agencies possess. However, there remains the traditional 
territorial problems and trust issues, such as which agency gets the credit for a 
successful case, that has traditionally plagued police working within the federated 
system of law enforcement. 
Police organizational leaders demonstrate to rank and file officers the 
importance in this specific area by the priority of enforcement placed on 
information sharing within the department. Akbulut (2003) labeled this leadership 
technique as providing agency championship within a department; that is, 
promoting an environment committed to the introduction and implementation of 
selected new initiatives. While agency championship does not necessarily have 
to be initiated by an organizational leader, it follows a police chief or supervisor 
will have the best chance of success in an organizational hierarchy which is flat 
compared to other professional organizations and also possesses a strict chain 
of command. 
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Implications 
The implications of the research suggest law enforcement must be more 
inclusive, uniform, and at the same time open to creative solutions in order to 
meet the increased demands for security in the terrorist age. Local law 
enforcement respondents in all geographic regions are open to participation in 
future partnerships with state and federal agencies. Local police officers in all 
regions view information sharing as not only a valuable investigative tool but also 
as an additional opportunity to network with other police officers, which could 
lead to career advancement opportunities. Local officers view information sharing 
as an opportunity to make more money, gain experience, and an opportunity to 
break away from the mundane daily tasks that traditionally occupy the majority of 
their time. 
 Many local officers also view information and joint technology sharing as 
a cornerstone for proactive policing practices. This study suggests information 
sharing programs can be utilized both within current traditional police systems as 
well as within community policing organizational models. The local police officers’ 
overwhelming support of proactive police tactics suggests the possibility of 
expansion of information sharing programs within the community policing model. 
The community policing model may prove to be preferable as programs could be 
implemented and expanded based on already established policing programs, 
which currently possess the support of the community.  
The final question of the survey questionnaire asked respondents what 
they believe to be the most prominent barrier or barriers to information sharing. 
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The two most significant barriers were a lack of trust between local and federal 
officers as well as a lack of compatibility of protocols—procedures between local 
and federal law enforcement agencies. Respondents listed “egos” or “issues of 
delegating credit for successful investigations” as the next most prevalent barrier. 
Another barrier listed was a lack of cooperation and unresponsiveness of federal 
agencies. Also, another barrier listed was the failure of time-sensitive information 
to be shared in a manner that enabled officers to immediately investigate and 
follow-up on the information shared, including classified issues of which 
individuals were entitled to receive the information. Cost issues were also listed 
as a serious concern. The problem of interoperability, that is, the lack of one 
database which can be accessed and shared over all levels of law enforcement 
was an additional barrier. Bureaucracy or too much red tape was the next barrier 
listed by respondents. Finally, competition for funds, failure to embrace 
organizational change, and more important and better things to do were listed as 
barriers by at least one respondent of the survey. 
The barriers listed by survey respondents fell into two categories. First, 
officers discussed the overall difficulty and complexity of the problem of sharing 
information on a national level and, from some respondents, from the local to 
local level. The process of organizing large amounts of police officers from 
different jurisdictions in all parts of the country to work together for a common 
purpose is difficult under the most favorable conditions. All four departments 
studied agreed the process itself is nearly impossible to operationalize. As one 
respondent from the south region stated, “the bad guys only have to be right 
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once, we (in our response effort) need to be right every time.” Local officers 
stated it is difficult enough to share information within their own region. One 
officer stated, “I barely know what is going on across the river in my own district, 
much less with the feds. I feel fortunate if I can get a timely response from a local 
all-points bulletin that is issued.” 
One north respondent stated that the compatibility issues between federal 
and local police agencies are complicated because federal law enforcement 
agencies are formulated as large, transient agencies, which are almost 
exclusively organized to conduct large-scale investigations. By contrast, local 
police agencies are primarily concerned with efficiently managing calls for service 
and addressing the problems of their community based, in part, on complaints of 
the citizens residing within their district. A north respondent believes differences 
in agency missions ultimately cause federal and local law enforcement to be 
incompatible. However, the same north respondent wrote,  
What will continue to draw the two sides together is the fact the leaders of 
local police agencies want the grant money and access to potentially 
unlimited resources the feds have to offer, while the feds want access to 
informants and information that local police officers inherently possess. 
For that reason, I believe the two levels of law enforcement officers will 
continue to work together, largely because they need each other in order 
to achieve their respective agency missions. 
The second barrier to information sharing lies in the entrenched territorial 
nature, which has been pervasive in police culture over the last century. The 
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culture barrier presents a more difficult challenge because it involves a negative 
aspect of police culture that has become more pervasive over time. Respondents 
in all parts of the country repeat the barriers of territoriality and distrust as severe 
barriers to intelligence information sharing. A 30-year veteran of the north 
department stated,  
There had to be a traumatic event such as 9/11, which unequivocally 
forces different jurisdictions and departments to work together for a 
common purpose. The government is largely a slow, reactive animal. The 
public outcry needs to be deafening on this issue, and the problem must 
also gain the support of the political administration in power, or it’s never 
going to happen on a large enough scale to prevent another serious attack 
from taking place. (J. Webster, personal communication, February 10, 
2010) 
Another north respondent stated,  
During my tenure as a police officer there has been a steady decline in our 
relations with federal government dating back to the war on drugs in the 
1980s, when crack cocaine first appeared like a plague on our city streets. 
One problem was the agents on the federal level assigned to the task 
forces were from other parts of the country. The individual federal agents 
were not bad people, and the distrust was not personally directed, but we 
knew the feds would be transferred in a couple of years to a different city 
within the agency. For the feds, it worked as a rotational system similar to 
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the military. Each field agent would spend a three-year rotation and then 
would be transferred in a few years with a promotion. 
In terms of the actual investigations, the feds depend heavily on our 
department for informants, which provided critical information on suspects 
and potential large buys, which was what the feds were primarily 
concerned with. However, the organizational structure was predicated on 
large, far-reaching investigations based on large buys which lead to 
multiple arrests were not possible without the information provided by our 
department. Local police officers are the primary brokers of information in 
their individual precincts. There is no exclusive federal territory per se; the 
feds operate in our territory. The local police officers have a monopoly on 
informants. The officers in my precinct knew all of the players in our city; 
we knew their tendencies, we even knew a lot of the time where and when 
the big deals would go down. Even so, it was difficult to coordinate with 
federal agents. (J. Burke, personal communication, December 22, 2010) 
Respondents from all regions cited a lack of sharing credit for large busts 
helped create the distrust between the two levels of law enforcement.  
The feds would swoop in at the last second, use our information gathered 
through months, sometimes years of investigative street work, use our 
manpower for support, and then take the credit for the arrest and receive a 
promotion. Our guys resented this situation, and the process was 
repeated over and over during my time at the department. The ego 
situation heightened the resentment from the local to the federal level. The 
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hostility grew to the point where we didn’t want to work with the feds on 
any level, regardless of the type or political importance placed on the 
investigation. 
We prided ourselves on doing a good job working together, even though 
we didn’t always share information effectively within our own department, 
much less the feds, we didn’t think we were above doing the dirty work. 
Generally speaking, federal agents are not expected to make the amount 
of quality arrests local police officers do if they want to get promoted. I 
don’t believe the feds possess the investigative skill as local officers 
simply because they do not handle a large volume of cases. When you 
handle a large amount of cases you learn to be efficient, including in your 
communication with other police officers. One of my favorite moments of 
my career was when the lead federal prosecutor called me into his office 
with the Attorney General and a couple of FBI men present to discuss an 
important case that we were working with the feds. The federal prosecutor 
turned to the attorney general and said, ‘I want you to see what a real 
police officer who does real police work looks like.’ 
The south police chief agreed and wrote,  
Our relationship with the feds has had a history of conflict, with the feds 
coming into our territory and promoting their agenda. Over a period of 
time, a climate of distrust has developed, which has been extremely 
difficult to undo. However, before we get into counterterrorism issues we 
need to solve some of the ego, territorial issues situations, such as which 
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federal agencies and local departments are going to run the investigations 
so credit can be shared. There are still tremendous ego problems over 
control of counterterrorism investigations and confusion over how the 
information should be shared.  
The same south respondent explained the effect of power that political 
agendas can have on the priorities and direction of federal and local law 
enforcement.  
On the federal level, the President dictates to law enforcement agencies 
the problems which need to be addressed and solved. Since 9/11, 
President George W. Bush has obviously made counterterrorism a priority. 
President Bush created a new federal agency devoted to counterterrorism 
at a great economic and political expense. I believe preceding presidents 
did not adequately address this issue because there was not a domestic 
attack on their watch.  
When I was in the prime of my career the issue was drugs. 
President Carter had more pressing domestic concerns with an economic 
recession, inflation, and gas shortages. Then President Reagan was 
elected and declared war on drugs. After President Reagan’s antidrug 
declaration, those were some of the busiest years on the force, and the 
time in which my colleagues and I had the heaviest caseload and contact 
with federal agencies. (J. Burke, personal communication, December 22, 
2010) 
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Another complaint of local law enforcement was the unresponsiveness of 
federal agencies when local officers attempted to share information or requested 
information. An officer in the east region stated,  
I don’t think the lack of information sharing is as much about malfeasance 
with their agency as it is about nonfeasance. Our department reaches out 
from time to time but we don’t get a response. I believe that the feds need 
some type of pressing personal interest in working with our department or 
it will never happen. (T. Goldberg, personal communication, March 9, 
2011) 
A north respondent stated,  
I remember when we received a notice from the Homeland Security 
Department that they were going to make an inspection of some 
dangerous chemicals located on the corporate campus of a Fortune 500 
company within our jurisdictional boundaries. Members of the company 
were founders of our local police charity, and our department supervisors 
were nervous about a surprise inspection by the feds, which could cause 
the company involved to lose millions of dollars for being shut down for 
even a half of a day. Even though the feds were the agency to originally 
contact our department, they failed to show up for the inspection for over 
thirteen months after they originally stated an inspection would take place. 
We spoke with three different teams of agents and two different 
supervisors throughout the ordeal and we never received a satisfactory 
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response from any of them. (J. Burke, personal communication, 
December 22, 2010) 
Another north respondent wrote,  
I remember a couple of years ago, I was assigned to a protective detail 
which involved the first ladies motorcade. I discovered through a routine 
check on the FBI’s watch list that the motorcade was to travel directly in 
front of two houses that were currently occupied by suspected 
international terrorists. I called the FBI first, since it was their watch list to 
confirm the information, but never heard back from them. In the meantime 
(less than forty-eight hours later), I was called by the secret service telling 
me the route had been changed. I can only deduce that either the secret 
service found out that the suspected terrorists lived in the area and 
changed the route, and the FBI just sat on the information, or the FBI 
called the secret service, and left our department out of the loop entirely. 
Either way, this does not speak very highly of the FBI’s ability or desire to 
share information with other need-to-know agencies. 
Limitations of the Study 
Additional studies are necessary in order to advance the body of research 
in an area vital to the future security of the United States. The opportunities to 
address the barriers associated with the potential development of comprehensive 
intelligence information sharing are limitless in scope. The present study is 
intended to serve as a beginning for future research using local police to examine 
some of the barriers to information sharing, but limitations within the present 
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study exist. Recommendations for future study are based upon research topics 
which were outside the parameters of this study but are integral to the 
advancement of future information sharing initiatives.  
First, future effort to expand this research should be conducted with the 
inclusion of more cities, which would provide greater geographic representation, 
generalizability, and enhance the sample size of officers participating in the 
study. Although great effort was made by this researcher to include four distinct 
geographic regions of the United States, expansion of cities would drastically 
enhance the study. Modifications also should be made to the survey instrument 
in order to raise the response rate. The number of pages in the survey instrument 
should be reduced in order to attract more respondents by the visual appearance 
of a shorter survey. 
Second, a thorough examination of the barriers to information sharing 
should include an examination of economic factors, which would affect the 
implementation of information sharing initiatives. However, in this study, the 
variable of cost was eliminated due to the fact that street-level police officers 
were the primary respondents of the study. Typically, street-level officers do not 
make budgetary decisions, and, therefore, it was not practical to include costs in 
a study comprised primarily of rank-and-file police officers. However, cost issues 
of all types may, in fact, be the most critical barrier to interoperable information 
sharing. Certainly, cost issues need to be included, if possible, in future studies. 
Finally, federal law enforcement personnel were exempt from participation 
in this study because of a lack of access by this researcher to the sample 
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population. Federal agents would have been useful because counterterrorism 
mandates, including the creation of the Homeland Security Department, were 
initiated on the federal level. The 9/11 Commission stated the federal 
government and its law enforcement agents were the level of government 
ultimately responsible for the implementation of all counterterrorism programs. In 
light of these facts, future studies, including federal law enforcement, would 
provide valuable additions to the literature.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Recommended topics for future researchers as it relates to the present 
study is to reconcile the discrepancy between the quantitative and qualitative 
results of the trust variable. The quantitative portion of the study revealed no 
significance between trust of officers in other departments and willingness to 
support intelligence information sharing initiatives. However, in the open-ended 
question at the conclusion of the survey, police officers listed a lack of trust of 
police officers in other departments as well as their own as a primary barrier to 
sharing information. The reconciliation of this discrepancy would provide a better 
understanding of the realities of everyday practice of law enforcement which 
serve as barriers to efficient information sharing. 
Future studies in regard to the present study are needed, which focus on 
the specific factors as to why older officers are more likely to support information 
sharing initiatives than younger officers. Additional information would be useful to 
police chiefs as they select members for future joint task forces, not only in terror 
cases but in other areas of law enforcement where task forces are utilized, such 
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as guns, gangs, and drugs. In the past, task force investigations have been 
successful because of the ability to merge resources as well as to utilize the best 
investigative attributes each agency or department has to offer. Additional 
knowledge in this research area would potentially expand the utilization of task 
forces in law enforcement. 
The 9/11 terrorist attack on New York City reinforced the need for review 
of all practical and strategic counterterrorism processes for the implementation of 
a unified enterprise architecture for the purpose of the creation of a single 
interoperable information sharing network. Government accountability reports 
continue to suggest that much work remains on the federal level to initiate and 
maintain the level of information communication needed to prevent future attacks 
(GAO, 2002a). Additional research would analyze the most effective proposal 
initiatives and examine whether the newly proposed initiatives could be 
realistically and uniformly adopted by federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies. Recommendations for future study are based upon research topics 
that fell outside the parameters of this study but are integral to the advancement 
of future information sharing initiatives. Recommendations were made in 
consultation with appropriate literature, the 9/11 Commission Report (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), the Heritage Foundation report (The 
Heritage Foundation, 2005), and the Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 
(H.R. No. 109-377, 2006).  
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Future studies that examine the bureaucratic tendencies of federal state 
and local law enforcement are critical to accurately assessing the benefits and 
risks of all proposed initiatives. Studies that examine the impact of proposed 
federal government initiatives are recommended because the process of 
reorganization, even though originating a decade ago, remains fluid and 
complex. Scholarly studies that examine government bureaucracies are useful in 
determining the protocols of government operations. The results of future studies 
will indicate which proposals have the best opportunity for implementation and 
long-term success. Since 2001, federal government bureaucracies, including law 
enforcement, have evolved and reorganized on such large scales that further 
examination of methods and processes is needed.  
Specifically, future studies are needed that examine aspects of the United 
States federated system of government, which encompasses law enforcement. 
The hierarchical nature of government bureaucracies presents a severe barrier in 
the development of comprehensive interoperable information sharing systems. 
The federated structure of the United States government has affected the 
efficiency and quality of participation of local law enforcement in regard to 
counterterrorism investigations. This approach has resulted in a lack of 
coordination from a communicative standpoint between all levels of law 
enforcement. Furthermore, organizational structure has created future barriers to 
implementation on the local law enforcement level regarding counterterrorism 
challenges. The challenges range from a lack of opportunity to take part and 
receive credit for participation in federally-dominated counterterrorism 
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investigations to a lack of resources or the lack of a local organizational structure, 
which could adequately support counterterrorism police services.  
From an organizational standpoint, the federated structure impacts the 
flow of communication, because information generates from the top to the bottom 
in the chain of command bureaucracy. The typical government agency in the 
United States (including law enforcement agencies) have been organized 
through decentralized stove-pipe organizational structures created as a 
component of the 1940s post-World War II government. Vertical governmental 
departments were created to oversee every task and service of an agency with 
limited capacity for communicative collaboration. As noted in the 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 
2004), prior to 9/11, the intelligence information flow was woefully decentralized, 
with disparate pieces of intelligence scattered nationally throughout the United 
States. Therefore, it is critical that future studies are conducted which follow the 
information sharing process from the federal to the local levels and analyze the 
efficiency as well as administrative delay in the old systems as compared to the 
new systems. 
Bardach (2001) noted that many proposals which outline future counter 
terrorism protocol lacked clarity and cohesion. Bardach stated past proposals 
were typically fundamentally incompatible with the Department of Homeland 
Security’s emphasis on inter agency collaboration and networking. The 
potentially catastrophic and unpredictable nature of events involved in terrorist 
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attacks, combined with the bureaucratic barriers involved in government 
hierarchy make information sharing extremely difficult. These forces in interaction 
with traditional police culture are antithetical to the successes of future 
information sharing programs. Successful processes comprise the fundamental 
core of interpretative communication. The processes are found in the concepts of 
efficiency, equality and adaptability. 
Additional studies should be examined with the goal of determining 
agency counterterrorism duties of all law enforcement agencies responsible 
(particularly on the federal level) for domestic counterterrorism operations. The 
roles and responsibilities for core federal agencies involved in counterterrorism 
efforts since 9/11 remain in the process of clarification. The Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation continue to reorganize their own agencies as 
well as prioritize operational duties in regard to key terrorism functions. The prior 
establishment of working relationships in regard to the reorganization of duties on 
the federal level is fundamental to the establishment of future information sharing 
initiatives with local law enforcement. Future studies, which examine the 
reorganization strategies of federal law enforcement, need to focus on the goals 
of organizational investigative efficiency while eliminating organizational and 
investigative specific redundancies (The Heritage Foundation, 2005). 
 Specifically, studies that examine the future role of the FBI in relation to 
its newly formed domestic terrorism partnership with the Department of 
Homeland Security are needed. The FBI was created to be a lead investigative 
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agency, structured to oversee all aspects of the investigate process, including the 
control and dissemination of sensitive information. Since 9/11, the FBI must fully 
integrate 28,000 employees and 56 field offices concerning the investigative 
responsibility on domestic terrorism with the Homeland Security Department and 
its merger of its 22 agencies. The FBI cannot effectively lead the domestic 
intelligence effort without other federal agencies, but the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security could help achieve this goal if the two 
agencies could efficiently coordinate domestic terrorism functions and 
responsibilities (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 424).  
The FBI does not possess the capacity to investigate cases at a state and 
local level with the responsibilities it now has at the federal level regarding 
homeland security. For example, state police organizations could be encouraged 
to coordinate resources on kidnapping cases, and full responsibility for 
enforcement of drug laws could be transferred to the bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
This proposal would decrease the FBI’s participation in state and local task 
forces cases, with a greater emphasis placed on domestic terrorism 
investigations (The Heritage Foundation, 2005). A comprehensive plan that 
assigns roles and missions to the relevant authorities must also be developed 
and adopted on all levels of law enforcement (Calfano, 2001, p. 16). 
Without clearly defined roles, federal government agencies will have 
difficulty delegating investigative responsibilities while maintaining viable working 
relationships with state and local law enforcement. The confusion over federal 
127 
 
guidance mandates serves as a barrier to information sharing, because the 
mandates unilaterally prioritize which elements should be implemented. The 
result has been each state and local municipality has been left to develop their 
own counterterrorism strategy. This approach has resulted in a predictably 
confusing and redundant course of action. Scholars with the assistance of 
information technology experts, all levels of law enforcement, government 
planners, and local citizen groups can contribute to the process with the benefit 
of taking the best suggestions for implementation contained within each study. In 
this manner the most promising suggestions can be combined into a nationally 
integrated information sharing plan.  
Scholarly studies that examine benchmark attributes of prior successful 
program development need to be analyzed by the Homeland Security 
Department going forward in a proactive attempt to improve counterterrorism 
strategy. For example, benchmarking of program development styles previously 
implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of 
Health and Human Services regarding other terrorist strategies would be 
beneficial. Waugh and Strieb (2006) noted the reactive paradigm employed in 
emergency-management procedures: “Policies and programs have been 
instituted and implemented in the aftermath of a disaster, based almost solely on 
that disaster experience and with little investment in capacity building to deal with 
the next disaster” (p. 137). Waugh and Strieb’s rethinking of emergency 
management protocols should become a research priority, specifically focusing 
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on a comprehensive plan including interoperable information sharing across all 
levels of law enforcement.  
Coordination planning between the public and private sectors also is 
necessary in order to develop a comprehensive homeland security program. A 
triangular organizational structure of checks and balances must be developed 
among the government, the private-sector, and the public. The United States 
government must assure citizens and private industry alike that, while it 
recognizes the responsibility of managing homeland security, it still needs the 
help of its citizens in order to be successful. An example of an opportunity to 
merge the two agencies for the purposes of security could be found in the risk 
assessment process. Risk-assessment studies are designed to prioritize and 
protect the most vulnerable areas in a potential terrorist attack.  
Risk benefit priorities should be determined through a cost-benefit 
analysis, which calculates potential positive outcomes against the risks involved 
in inadequately securing a target. Accurate assessments of the security of public 
infrastructure are an example of a cost-benefit analysis. Additional studies are 
recommended, in part because of the existence of budgetary constraints, and 
areas deemed the most vulnerable (large, coastal, metropolitan areas) need to 
be given priority. For example, urban areas in the vicinity of nuclear power plants; 
dams; electricity systems; and oil and gas delivery, storage, and refinement 
systems must be a top strategic priority (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks, 2004, p. 428; The Heritage Foundation, 2005).  
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Additional studies are needed to examine the direct and latent costs of 
implementing homeland security policy, particularly in the areas of grants and 
oversight at the federal level. Homeland security assistance should be delegated 
based solely on the assessment of risks and vulnerabilities, not on a general 
revenue-sharing model (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 396). 
Difficult choices have not been made involving the allocation of limited resources 
in an era of both decreasing public revenues and available law enforcement 
manpower. Scholars and government administrators need to analyze, identify, 
and rank critical national security assets to ensure the most important and 
vulnerable targets are protected. A comprehensive plan which assigns strategic 
missions to the relevant authorities must also be developed across all levels of 
government (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 391). 
A scholarly assessment of grant programs and oversight are critical to the 
implementation of information sharing programs because grants are the 
preferred transfer method of government funds from the federal government to 
state and local law enforcement. First, studies which examine the lack of 
preparedness standards increase the difficulty for scholars to accurately measure 
gaps in first responder (including law enforcement) capabilities. The Department 
of Homeland Security has not developed sufficient benchmarks that could be 
utilized to determine whether preparedness standards are being met, to establish 
and examine future goals, or to determine whether the grants received by state 
and local police departments are being efficiently allocated. Additionally, federal 
research could determine whether state and local law enforcement, which 
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comprise the majority of first responders, have the funds available and are able 
to efficiently target priority areas for which the grants were intended.  
No established process exists for collecting data on the amounts of first 
responder grants available assessed by each state and local agency. Accurate 
grant assessment plans would provide scholars and government officials with 
reliable data to determine future budgets and establish effective oversight, 
analyze gaps, and access progress toward the achievement of future goals. The 
GAO (2002b) reported difficulty in determining the results and establishing 
baseline data to access future strategic priorities. One GAO (2002c) study 
indicated a high percentage of grant money was spent on equipment, planning, 
and training, including all types of emergency exercises, such as biological terror 
and natural disasters. On a micro level, future studies that track data are needed 
in order to follow allocated government funds throughout the grant cycle. Many 
grants were unable to be studied and tracked because some grants were 
earmarked to state and local governments, while others were allocated directly to 
state and local law enforcements and first responders (GAO, 2002c). 
The development of an effective interoperable communication system is a 
critical element of any new counterterrorism policy. Critical to the achievement of 
interoperability is the implementation of seamless communicative strategies that 
result in the most effective and efficient sharing of information between all levels 
of law enforcement. Interoperability allows first responders the ability to share 
information in real-time and on demand through wireless communication as 
needed and authorized. Interoperability allows the strategic opportunity for all 
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participating law enforcement agencies and first responders on all levels of 
government to communicate and work together. Current interagency 
communication systems make information sharing difficult. At the same time, 
changes in existing procedures must be universally adopted, or they will not be 
effective.  
Kiernan (2003) stated communications interoperability was an 
acknowledged operational deficiency in counterterrorism strategy. First 
responder command and control practices were previously structured around 
providing tactical support for the incident commander with little or no coordination 
and collaboration outside the immediate area impacted by the immediate 
emergency area. Communication interoperability and common operating 
platforms can no longer be viewed as beneficial by-products; they must become 
fundamental requirements (J. Booth, personal communication, December 14, 
2002 as cited in Kiernan, 2003). 
There continues to be considerable scholarly interest in the exploration of 
how increased communicative efficiency can be used to promote future 
information sharing initiatives (including interoperability) among agencies in the 
common mission of protecting the United States. The benefits of sharing 
information have proven through prior scholarly research to be too strategically 
valuable to be ignored. Research has shown that increased interest among local 
law enforcement has the potential to increase the productivity and performance 
of all law enforcement agencies, as well as improve operational efficiency, and 
provide better police services to all citizens.  
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Because the barriers to efficient information sharing (including 
interoperability) are so numerous, the opportunities for future research in this 
area could realistically occupy and engage scholars for generations. Although 
this study focused on the barriers to implementation on the local levels, further 
research and analysis concerning the federal government’s role in the 
implementation of new strategies and protocol needs to be explored. The 
implementation of future strategies remains fluid, and both original and replicate 
research concerning the development of such processes are both timely and 
necessary moving forward.  
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY 
INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY 
 
 
The purpose of this survey is to identify the barriers to intelligence information sharing 
perceived by local law enforcement and to develop strategies that can be used to overcome 
these barriers. This survey will help local law enforcement voice their concerns, issues, and 
expectations about participating in intelligence information sharing initiatives. 
 
The survey will take approximately ten minutes to complete. All individual responses will 
remain strictly confidential; only summary statistics will be recorded. You are guaranteed 
anonymity. No one but the researchers will have access to these responses, and your 
identity will not be linked to this record. However, if for any reason you do not want to 
answer any or all of the items below, you can refrain from doing so. If you believe you 
cannot answer any of the questions honestly, please do not answer them at all. If you can 
answer all of the items, it will be very helpful. We are grateful for your cooperation. 
 
Please return the completed survey to        
   
or Scott Bransford, conductor of the study, at the address below. If you have any 
questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact Scott Bransford at any of the 
numbers listed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scott D. Bransford 
Doctoral Student 
University of Southern Mississippi 
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART I 
 
Please circle the appropriate background information which best describes you. 
 
 
 
A.  Your gender:  Male  Female 
 
 
B.  Your race/ethnicity:  White  Black  Hispanic Other 
 
 
C.  Your age group: 20-30        31-40         41-50        51-60        61+ 
 
 
D.  Highest level of education you have attained:  
 
High School               Bachelor’s               Master’s               Doctorate      Other 
 
 
E.  Number of years experience as a law enforcement officer:  
0-5  6-10  11-15  16-20  21-25  26+ 
 
 
F.  Have you served in the military: YES  NO 
 
 
G.  Type of training curriculum:  Traditional       Community Policing
 Unknown 
 
 
H.  Your rank: Patrol Officer  Corporal       Sergeant        Other 
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART II 
 
Please rate the importance of achieving each of the following benefits of electronic 
information sharing in terms of your agency’s decisions whether or not to participate in 
electronic information sharing with federal agencies. For each item below, please place a 
checkmark in the box that best describes your view. 
 
 
STATEMENT UNIMPORTANT 
OF LITTLE 
IMPORTANCE 
NEUTRAL IMPORTANT 
VERY 
IMPORTANT 
If I were appointed the chief 
administrator of my agency, I 
would be willing to allocate 
additional resources to 
sharing information. 
     
If I were appointed the chief 
administrator of my agency, I 
would place a priority on 
information sharing training 
with other law enforcement 
agencies. 
     
If I were appointed the chief 
administrator of my agency, I 
would be willing to spend a 
large amount of time to learn 
a new computer system 
format, which has the 
potential to provide useful 
investigative information. 
     
Sharing information would be 
easier and more efficient if 
there was one database which 
could be accessed from all 
departments, across all levels 
of law enforcement. 
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART III 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following 
statements.  
For each statement below, please place a checkmark in the box that best describes your view. 
 
 
 
STATEMENT 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
Information obtained from 
citizens is critical to good police 
work. 
     
Cooperation with other agencies 
is critical to good police work. 
     
I sometimes need access to 
information during the course of 
an investigation that I know other 
law enforcement agencies have. 
     
I believe preventing crimes is just 
as important as solving crimes. 
     
I believe that solving problems in 
the community is an important 
part of police work. 
     
The attack of 9/11 has increased 
the need for better 
communication between all levels 
of law enforcement. 
     
I believe the overall benefits of 
sharing information outweigh the 
negatives. 
     
Federal agencies have suggested 
that our agency share intelligence 
information electronically. 
     
Our agency has been criticized by 
other law enforcement agencies 
for our handling of information 
during a joint investigation. 
     
Federal agencies have had an 
influence on our department’s 
decision to share information with 
other agencies. 
     
Our agency has previously 
accepted an invitation from a 
federal agency to participate in a 
joint training task force initiative. 
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…Part III Continued 
 
STATEMENT 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
Federal agencies keep our agency 
informed about the downside of not 
sharing information. 
     
It is difficult to learn computer skills 
necessary for sharing information 
with other law enforcement agencies. 
     
Electronic information sharing of 
intelligence information is a difficult 
concept to understand. 
     
It is more difficult to share 
information with other law 
enforcement agencies, which do not 
have the same standard operating 
procedures as my agency. 
     
Federal agencies and our agency have 
a high level of mutual trust. 
     
Federal agencies keep our agency’s 
best interests in mind.  
     
If my agency shared intelligence 
information with a federal agency, I 
am confident that the information 
shared would not be compromised. 
     
Pertinent information and 
investigative assistance are encouraged 
by my agency. 
     
I would feel comfortable going 
outside of my agency’s chain of 
command if I believed I had 
investigative information, which was 
being ignored. 
     
If I were appointed chief 
administrator of my agency, I would 
make information sharing a priority. 
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART IV  
 
In your opinion, what are the major barriers to successful intelligence information sharing 
initiatives between local and federal agencies? 
 
STATEMENT 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
I would be more likely to support 
information sharing practices if I were 
given greater flexibility by my 
supervisor to conduct and share 
information as the investigation 
dictates. 
     
I believe that learning and applying 
intelligence information sharing 
techniques is important for my career. 
     
The time my supervisors make me 
spend on tasks associated with 
information sharing could be better 
spent in other areas of law 
enforcement. 
     
My agency administrators make 
information sharing a priority in my 
department. 
     
I would be more likely to support 
increased information sharing if my 
supervisor believed it was important. 
     
 
 
INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART V 
 
In your opinion, what are the major barriers to the implementation of intelligence 
information sharing initiatives between local, state, and federal agencies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation in completing this survey. If you believe there are any points of particular 
interest to your agency concerning intelligence information sharing that this survey has failed to address, please 
feel free to elaborate below. 
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IRB APPROVAL 
 
140 
 
REFERENCES 
Adair, J. G. (1984). The Hawthorne effect. Journal of Applied Psychology, 69(2), 
334-345. 
Adams, R., Rohe, W. M., & Accury, T. A. (2002). Implemented community-
oriented policing: Organizational change and street officer attitudes. Crime 
& Delinquency, 48, 399-430. 
Akbulut, A. (2003). An investigation of the factors that influence electronic 
information sharing between state and local agencies (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA.  
Aldrich, H. (1976). Resource dependence and interorganizational relations using 
local employment services offices and social service sector organizations. 
Administration and Society, 7, 419-476.  
Angell, J. E. (1976). Organizing police units for the future. An update on the 
Democratic model. Criminology, 9, 185-206. 
Babbie, E. (1989). The practice of social research (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth. 
Bardach, E. (2001). Development Dynamics: Interagency collaboration as an 
emergent phenomenon. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 11, 149-164. 
Bayley, D. H. (1988). Community policing: A report from the devil’s advocate. In 
J. R. Greene & S. D. Mastrofski (Eds.), Community policing: Rhetoric or 
reality? (pp. 225-238). New York, NY: Praeger. 
141 
 
Benson, J. K. (1975). The interorganizational network as a political economy. 
Administration Sciences Quarterly, 20, 229-249.  
Berman, E., & West, J. (2002). Workplace relations: Friendship patterns and 
consequences according to managers. Public Administration Review, 
62(2), 217-230. 
Bingham, R. D. (1976). The adoption innovation by local government. Lexington, 
MA: D.C. Health and Company.  
Birzer, M. L., & Tannehill, R. (2004). A more effective training approach for 
contemporary policing. Police Quarterly, 4(2), 232-252. 
Blau, P. M. (1963). The dynamics of bureaucracy: A study of interpersonal 
relations in two government agencies. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Burns, T., & Stalker, T. (1994). The management of innovation. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Calfano, B. R. (2001). Terror in the air: Biological weapons, terrorism, and 
asymmetric threats to United States national security in the twenty-first 
century (Unpublished thesis). Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.  
Campbell, D., & Stanley, J. C. (1966). Experimental and quasi experimental 
designs for research. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.  
Chappell, A. (2009). The philosophical versus actual adoption of community 
policing. Criminal Justice Review, 34(1), 5-28.  
Chess, C. (2001). Organizational theory and the stages of risk communication. 
Risk Analysis, 22(1), 179-188. 
142 
 
Chess, C., Salonlone, K., & Hence, B. (1995). Improving risk communication in 
government: Research priorities. Risk Analysis, 15(2), 127-135. 
Choi, H. (1993). Administrative delay in government: Can information technology 
help? With a focus on the United States local government (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). Syracuse University, New York, NY. 
Colwell, L. H., Miller, H., Lyons, P., & Miller, R. (2006). The training of law 
enforcement. Police Quarterly, 9, 275-290. 
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. (1979). Quasi experimentation: Design and analysis 
issues. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin.  
Cordner, G. W. (1978). Open and closed models in police organizations: 
Traditions dilemmas and practical consideration. Journal of Police Science 
and Administration, 6, 22-34.  
Cordner, G. W., Gaines, L. W., & Kappeler, V. E. (1996). Police organizations: 
Analysis and evaluations. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. 
Crank, J. P. (1998). Understanding police culture. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. 
Creswell, J. W. (2005). Educational research: Planning, conducting, and 
evaluating quantitative and qualitative research. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson. 
Damanpour, F. (1991). Organizational innovation: A meta-analysis of effects of 
determinants and moderators. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3), 
355-390. 
Daniels, R. (2009). Evaluation of management and organizational theory: 
Administrative processes in government. New York, NY: Harpers. 
143 
 
Danzinger, J. N. (1979). Technology and productivity: A contingency analysis of 
computers in local governments. Administrative and Society, 11(2), 144-
171. 
Dawes, S. (1996). Interagency information sharing: Expected benefits, 
manageable risks. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 15(3), 
377-394. 
Dillman, D. (2007). Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method (2nd 
ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Doherty, S. (2006, Fall). Community policing and homeland security. Police 
Chief, 73(2), 78-81. 
Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Scott, Foresman and 
Company.  
Eck, T. E., & Newell, C. (1987). Who ya gonna call? The police as problem 
busters. Crime and Delinquency, 33, 31-52. 
Emerson, S. (2002). American Jihad: The terrorists living among us. New York, 
NY: Free Press.  
Engel, D. S., & Worden, R. (2003). Police attitudes, behavior and supervisory 
influences: An analysis of problem solving. Criminology, 41, 131-166. 
Fitzgerald, J. D., & Cox, S. M. (1987). Research methods in criminal justice: An 
introduction. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. 
Flesch, R. (1948). A new readability yardstick. Journal of Applied Psychology, 32, 
221-233. 
144 
 
Fridell, L. (2004). The results of three national surveys on community policing. In 
L. Fridell & M. A. Wycoff (Eds.), Community policing, past, present, and 
future (pp. 39-58). Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. 
Gaffigan, S. J., Roth, J. A., & Buerger, M. E. (2000). Origins and objectives of the 
COPS program – Title I of the 1994 Crime Act (NCJ Report No. 183643). 
Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.  
Gaines, L. K., Kappeler, V. E., & Vaughn, J. B. (1997). Policing in America (2nd 
ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. 
Garfield, M. (2000). Critical success factors for state telemedicine policy. 
Proceedings of Americas Conference on Information Systems (pp. 1573-
1578). Long Beach, CA: Westgate.  
Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime 
and Delinquency, 25(2), 236-258.  
Goldstein, H. (1987). Toward community-oriented policing. Potential basic 
requirements and threshold questions. Crime and Delinquency, 33, 6-30. 
Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-oriented policing. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.  
Goodsell, C. (1983). The case for bureaucracy: A public administration polemic. 
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers. 
Gottfredson, G. D. (1996). The Hawthorne misunderstanding: How to get the 
Hawthorne effect in action research. Journal of Research and Crime 
Delinquency, 31(1), 28-48.  
Greene, J. R., & Mastrofski, S. D. (Eds.). (1988). Community policing: Rhetoric or 
reality? New York, NY: Praeger.  
145 
 
Guetzkow, H. (1962). Relations among organizations: A research symposium. 
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. 
Gulick, L. (1937). Papers on the science of administration. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Publishers.  
Hagan, J., & McCarthy, B. (1997). Anomie, social capital and street criminology. 
In N. Passas & R. Agnew (Eds.), The future of anomie theory (pp. 118-
132). Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. 
Hickman, M. J., & Reaves, B. A. (2001). Community policing in local police 
departments, 1997-1999, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington DC: 
United States Department of Justice. 
Homans, G. C. (1950). The human group. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace. 
Homans, G. C. (1974). Social behavior in its elementary forms. New York, NY: 
Harcourt Brace. 
Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, H.R. 4598, 107th Cong., 2d Session 
(2002). 
H.R. Rep No. 109-377 (2006). 
Hummel, R. P. (1977). The bureaucratic experience: New York, NY: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2002). Criminal intelligence 
sharing: A national plan for intelligence-led policing at the local, state and 
federal levels. Alexandria, VA: COPS and International Association of 
Chiefs of Police. 
146 
 
Jenson, G., Erikson, M., & Gibbs, J. P. (1978). Perceived risk of punishment and 
self-reported delinquency. Social Forces, 57, 57-78.  
Kappeler, V. E., Sluder, R., & Alpert, G. P. (1998). Forces of defiance: 
Understanding the dark side of policing. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland 
Press. 
Kaufman, H. (1977). Red tape: Its origins, uses, and abuses. Washington, DC: 
Brookings.  
Kelling, G. L. (1994). Measuring what matters. A new way of thinking about crime 
and Disorder. City Journal, 2, 21-34. 
Kelling, G. L., & Coles, C. (1996). Fixing broken windows: Restoring order and 
reducing crime in our communities. New York, NY. Praeger. 
Kiernan, K. L. (2003). Learning new traditions of partnership, coordination, and 
jurisdiction: A critical ethnographic investigation of the long-term effects of 
Homeland Security on national policy (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
Northern Illinois University, De Kalb, IL.  
Kim, H. J., & Bretschneider, S. (2004). Local government information technology 
capacity: An exploratory theory. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences (p. 5021b). Honolulu, HI: 
Citeseer Publishers. 
Kohn, M. (1971). Bureaucratic man: A portrait and an interpretation. Sociological 
Review, 36(3), 461-474. 
147 
 
Landsbergen, D., & Wolken, G. (2001). Realizing the promise: Government 
information systems and the fourth generation of information technology. 
Public Administration Review, 61(2), 206-218. 
Lansford, T., Pauley, R. J., & Covarrubias, J. (2006). To protect and defend: U.S. 
security policy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Leedy, P., & Ormrod, J. E. (2005). Practical research: Planning and design (8th 
ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Leiss, W. (1996). Three phases in the evolution of risk communication practice. 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
545(1), 85-89. 
Leonard, G., & More, H. W. (1978). Police organization and management. New 
York, NY: Fountain Press. 
Lersch, K. (2002). Policing and misconduct. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-
Hall.  
Levine, S., & White, P. E. (1961). Exchange as a conceptual framework for the 
study of interorganizational relationships. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 5, 588. 
Levitan, D. M. (2001). Political ends and administrative means. In C. Stivers 
(Ed.), Democracy, bureaucracy, and the study of administration (pp. 4-13). 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public 
services. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
148 
 
Litwak, E., & Hylton, L. F. (1962). Interorganizational analysis: A hypothesis on 
coordinating agencies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 395-420.  
Lyons, W. (2002). Partnerships, information, and public safety: Community 
policing in an age of terror. International Journal of Police Strategies and 
Management, 25(3), 530-542. 
Manning, P. K. (1997). Police work: The social organization of policing. Prospect 
Heights, IL: Waveland.  
March, J., & Simon, H. (1958). Organizations. New York, NY: John Wiley.  
Marchand, D. (2004, February). Information strategy as a key success factor for 
enterprises and universities. Poster session presented at the 7th 
International Bielefeld Conference, Bielefeld, Germany. 
Markus, M., & Keil, W. (1994). If we build it they will come: Designing information 
technology systems that people will want to use. Sloan Management 
Review, 11-25. 
Mastrofski, S. D. (1998). Community policing and police organizations structure. 
In J. P. Brodeur (Ed.), How to recognize good policing: Problems and 
issues (pp. 249-279). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2000). State agent or citizen agent: Two 
narratives of discretion. Public Administration Research and Theory, 2, 
329-358. 
McDonnell, D. (2002). The future of policing. International Journal of Police 
Science Management, 4(3), 283-284. 
149 
 
McPherson, N. (2007). Technology for community policing: Community oriented 
policing service. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.  
Merton, R. K. (1990). Bureaucratic theory and social structure. Social Forces, 18, 
560-568.  
Morgan, G. (1998). Images of organizations: The executive edition. San 
Francisco, CA: Barrett-Foehlers. 
Myers, C. (1967). The impact of computers on management. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Nachmias, D., & Rosenbloom, D. H. (1980). Bureaucratic government USA. 
New York, NY: St. Martins Press. 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: 
Final report of the National Commission on terrorist attacks upon the 
United States. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
Neuman, W. L. (2006). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative 
approaches (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education. 
Newcomer, K. E., & Caudle, S. L. (1991). Evaluating public sector information 
systems: More than meets the eye. Public Administration Review, 51(5), 
377-384. 
Nigro, F. A. (1970). Modern public administration (2nd ed.). New York, NY: 
Harper and Row. 
Nonet, P., & Selznick, P. (2001). Law and society in transition: Toward 
responsive law. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press. 
150 
 
Norris, D. F. (1989). Microcomputers and local government (3rd ed.). 
Washington, DC: ICMA. 
Office of Homeland Security. (2002, July). National strategy for homeland 
security. Retrieved from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf 
Office of Homeland Security. (2007, October). National strategy for information 
sharing: Success and challenges in improving terrorism-related 
information sharing. Washington, DC: Morgan James. 
Oliver, W. M. (2007). Homeland security for policing. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Owen, D. E. (1989). RM concepts: Building blocks for the 1990s. Information 
Management Review, 5(2), 19-28. 
Palmiotto, R. (2000). Community policing: A policy strategy for the 21st century. 
Boston, MA: Jones and Bartlett.  
Patterson, G., & Sprehe, J. T. (2002). Principal challenges facing electronic 
records management in federal agencies today. Government Information 
Quarterly, 19(3), 307-315.  
Payne, D. M., & Trojanowicz, R. (1985). Performance profiles of foot versus 
motor officers. Retrieved from 
http://www1.cj.msu.edu/~people/cp/perform.html  
Perrow, C. (1967). A framework for the comparative analysis of organizations. 
American Sociological Review, 32, 194-208. 
151 
 
Perry, J. L., & Danzinger, J. N. (1999). The adaptability of innovations: An 
empirical assessment of computer applications in local governments. 
Administration and Society, 1(4), 461-492. 
Peters, G. (2001). The politics of bureaucracy (5th ed.). London, England: 
Rutledge. 
Peters, R. G., Covello, V. T., & McCallum, D. B. (1997). The determinants of trust 
and credibility in environmental risk communication: An empirical study. 
Risk Analysis, 17(1), 43-54. 
Piquero, A., & Hickman, M. (1999). An empirical test of Title’s control balance 
theory. Criminology, 37(2), 319-343. 
Posner, G. (2003). Why America slept: The failure to prevent 9/11. New York, 
NY: Random House. 
Premkumar, G., Ramamurthy, K., & Nilakanta, S. (1994). Implementation of 
electronic data interchange: An innovation diffusion perspective. Journal of 
Management Information Systems, 11(2), 157-168. 
Pretlow, C. (2008). Readability test at Juicy Studio. Computers in Libraries, 
28(16), 17-18. 
Radalet, C. A., & Carter, D. L. (1994). The police and the community (5th ed.). 
New York, NY: MacMillan College Publishing.  
Ratcliffe, J. H. (2003). Intelligence-led policing. Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice, 248, 1-6.  
Reif, G. (1968). A service architecture for mobile teamwork: Software and 
knowledge engineering. New York, NY: ACM Publishers. 
152 
 
Relyea, H. (2004). Homeland security and information sharing: Federal policy 
considerations. Government Information Quarterly, 21(14), 420-428.  
Reuss-Ianni, E. (1983). Two cultures of policing. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books.  
Riley, K. J., & Hoffman, B. (1995). Domestic terrorism: A national assessment of 
state and local preparedness. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 
Roberts, A. (2006). Blacked out: Government secrecy in the information age. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of innovations (5th ed.). New York, NY: Free 
Press. 
Rosenbaum, D. P., & Lurigio, A. J. (1994). An inside look at community policing 
reform: Definitions, organizational changes and evaluation findings. Crime 
and Delinquency, 40(2), 331-353. 
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. (1991). Essentials of behavioral research (2nd ed.). 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.  
Rubin, H. J. (1983). Applied social research. Columbus, OH: Chas. E. Merrill.  
Runge, D. A. (1985). Using telecommunications for competitive advantage 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Oxford University, England. 
Sadd, S., & Grinc, R. M. (1994). Innovated neighborhood oriented policing: 
Descriptions of programs in eight cities. New York, NY: Vera Institute of 
Justice. 
153 
 
Sarewitz, D., Pielke, R., & Keykhah, M. (2003). Vulnerability and risk: Some 
thoughts from a political and policy perspective. Risk Analysis, 23(4), 805-
811. 
Schermerhorn, J. R., Jr., Hunt, J. G., & Osborn, R. N. (1994). Managing 
organizational behavior (5th ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Shafritz, J. M., & Ott, J. S. (2001). Classics of organization theory (5th ed.). Fort 
Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers. 
Shein, E. H. (1996). Three cultures of management: The key to organizational 
learning. Sloan Management Review Journal, 38(1), 22-33.  
Simon, H. A. (2000). The proverbs of administration. In C. Stivers (Ed.), 
Democracy, bureaucracy, and the study of administration (pp. 38-59). 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Reprinted from The proverbs of 
administration, by H. A. Simon, 1946, Public Administrative Review, 6, pp. 
53-67) 
Simon, M., & Francis, J. B. (2006). The dissertation and research cookbook: 
From soup to nuts (4th ed.). Dubuque, IA: Kendall and Hunt. 
Sjoberg, L. (2002). Limits of knowledge and the limited importance of trust. Risk 
Analysis, 21(1), 189-198. 
Skogan, W., & Frydl, K. (1999). Fairness and effectiveness in policing. The 
evidence. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
Skogan, W., & Frydl, K. (Eds.). (2004). Fairness and effectiveness in policing. 
The evidence. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
154 
 
Skogan, W., Hartnett, J., Du Bois, J., Comey, M., & Lovig, J. (1999). On the beat: 
Police and community problem solving. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Skogan, W., & Hartnett, S. M. (1997). Community policing: Chicago style. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Skogan, W. G. (1994, August). The community’s role in community policing. 
National Institute of Justice Journal, 231, 31-34.  
Skogan, W. G. (2004). Community policing: Common impediments to success. In 
L. Fridell & M. A. Wycoff (Eds.), Community policing: Past present and 
future (pp. 159-167). Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. 
Skolnick, J. (1994). Justice without trial: Law enforcement in a democratic 
society. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.  
Skolnick, J. H., & Bailey, D. H. (1986). Theme and variation in community 
policing. Crime and Justice, 10, 1-37.    
Son, J. Y., Narashiman, S., & Riggins, F. J. (1999). Factors affecting the extent 
of electronic cooperation between firms: Economic and sociological 
perspectives. Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference on 
Information Systems (pp. 556-560). Charlotte, NC: Association for 
Computing Machinery. 
Sparrow, M. K., Moore, M. H., & Kennedy, D. M. (1990). Beyond 911: A new era 
for policing. New York, NY: Basic Books.  
Stark, R. (2004). The organizational age. Sociology (3rd ed.). New York, NY: 
Prentice Hall. 
155 
 
Stevens, D. (1999). Corruption among narcotics officers: A study of innocence 
and integrity. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 14(2), 1-10. 
Stone, A. R., & De Luca, S. M. (1994). Police administration: An introduction (2nd 
ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Sullivan, J. P. (2005). Terrorism early warning and co-production of 
counterterrorism intelligence. Montreal, Quebec, Canada: Canadian 
Association for Security and Intelligence Studies.  
Swanton, B. (1981). Social isolation of the police: Structural detriments and 
remedies. Police Studies, 3, 14-21. 
Tait, P., & Vessey, I. (1988). The effect of information sharing: A contingency 
approach. MIS Quarterly, 12(1), 91-108. 
Taylor, F. W. (1911). Principles of scientific management. New York, NY: Harper. 
Taylor, R. (1986). Value added processes in information systems. Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex Publishing Corporation. 
The Heritage Foundation. (2005). Homeland Security and terrorism: The 
Heritage Foundation recommendations. Available from 
http://www.heritage.org 
The Virtual Office of Congresswoman Jane Harman. (2002, June 26). Harman’s 
intelligence sharing legislation overwhelmingly passed by U.S. House 
[Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://www.house.gov/harman/press/releases/2002/062602PR_InfoSharin
g.html 
156 
 
Tilley, N. (2004). Community policing and problem solving. In W. G. Skogan 
(Ed.), Community policing (Can it work?) (pp. 165-184). Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth. 
Tornatzky, L., & Fleisher, M. (1990). The process of technological innovation, 
Lexington, MA: Smith. 
Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. (1993). The cultures of work organizations. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Trojanowicz, R. C., & Bucqueroux, B. (1999). Community policing: A 
contemporary perspective. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. 
Trojanowicz, R. C., Kappeler, V. E., Gaines, L. K., & Bucqueroux, B. (1998). 
Community policing: A contemporary perspective (2nd ed.). Cincinnati, 
OH: Anderson. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2010). Occupational 
outlook handbook. Washington, DC: Author. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2002a). Homeland security: Efforts 
under way to develop enterprise architecture, but much work remains 
(GAO Publication No. GAO-04-777). Washington, DC: Author.  
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2002b). Homeland security: 
Management challenges facing federal leadership (GAO Publication No. 
GAO-03-260). Washington, DC: Author.  
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2002c). Homeland security: 
Management of First Responder Grant has improved, but challenges 
remain (GAO Publication No. GAO-05-121). Washington, DC: Author.  
157 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2003). Homeland security: Information 
sharing   responsibilities, challenges, and key management issues (GAO 
Publication No. GAO-03-1165t). Washington, DC: Author.  
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2005, February). Management of first 
responder grant programs has improved, but challenges remain (GAO 
Publication No. GAO-05-121). Washington, DC: Author. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2006, March). Information sharing: The 
Federal Government needs to establish policies and processes for sharing 
terrorism-related and sensitive but unclassified information (GAO 
Publication No. GAO-06-385). Washington, DC: Author.  
Vidmar, N. (1979). The other issues in jury simulation research: A Commentary 
with particular reference to defendant character studies. Law and Human 
Behavior, 3, 95-106.  
Volkoff, O., Chan, Y. E., & Newson, E. (1999). Leading the development and 
implementation of collaborative interorganizational systems. MIS 
Quarterly, 35, 36-75. 
Walker, S. (1993). Does anyone remember team policing? Lessons of the team 
policing experience. American Journal of Police, 12(1), 33-55.  
Warner, M. (2007). Kafka, Weber and organizational theory. Human Relations, 
60(7), 1019-1138. 
Watson, H. J., Houdeshel, G., & Rainer, K., Jr. (1997). Building executive 
information systems and other decision support applications. New York, 
NY: Wiley. 
158 
 
Waugh, W. L., & Strieb, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective 
emergency [Special edition]. Public Administrative Review, 131-139. 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press. (Original work published in 1922) 
Weisburd, D., & Eck, J. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder, 
and fear? Annals of the American Academy of political and Social 
Science, 553(1), 43-65. 
Weisburd, D., & Greenspan, R. (2000). Police attitudes towards the abuse of 
authority: Findings from a national study. Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181312.pdf 
Westley, W. (1953). A sociological study of law, custom, and morality. American 
Journal of Sociology, 49, 34-41. 
Whitley, B. E. (1996). Principles of research in behavioral science. London, 
England: Mayfield. 
Willis, J. J., Mastrofski, S. D., & Weisburd, D. (2004). Compstat and bureaucracy: 
A case study of challenges and opportunities for change. Justice 
Quarterly, 21(3), 463-496.  
Wilson, J. M. (2006). Community policing in America. New York, NY: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis.  
Winfree, T., Guiterman, D., & Mays, L. (1997). Work assignments and police 
work: Exploring the work world of sworn officers in four New Mexico 
departments. Policing, 20(2), 419-441. 
159 
 
Wise, C. R. (2002). Organizing for Homeland Security. Public Administrative 
Review, 62(2), 129-145. 
Zaltman, G., Duncan, R., & Holbek, J. (1973). Innovations and organizations. 
New York, NY: John Wiley. 
Zhao, J., Thurman Q. C., & Reis, L. (2008). An examination of strategic planning 
in American law enforcement: A national study. Police Quarterly, 11, 3-26. 
  
 
